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## West Europe Report

(FOUO 12/81)



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On behalf of all of us in FBIS I wish to express appreciation to our readers who have guided our efforts throughout the years.

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THEATER FORCES

FRANCE

'NUCLEAR MAGINOT LINE' CONCEPT CRITICIZED, DEFENDED

Paris STRATEGIQUE in French [Oct-Dec] No 3, 1980 pp 89-122

[Article by Jean-Baptiste Margeride\*; passages enclosed in slantlines in italics]

[Excerpts] In ever increasing numbers since the mid-1970's, Western military specialists have been addressing the grave issue of adequation of NATO defense plans and means to meet a potential aggression by the Warsaw Pact forces.

These specialists estimate that the unflagging over-arming effort being deployed by the East European nations, in conventional<sup>(1)</sup> as well as tactical and theater nuclear weapons, and in chemical warfare weapons, has given them an overwhelming superiority. Added to this superiority of forces is their degree of immediate availability, which is constantly being increased, thus increasing the potential for a surprise attack.

In the face of this constantly growing threat, Western defensive capabilities are, in the view of these specialists, decidedly inferior; and as for Western plans, these have hardly changed in 20 years or more and have not been updated in accordance with the many technological changes.<sup>(2)</sup>

More recently, and to remedy this situation, certain authors, led by American Physicist Samuel T. Cohen, have proposed the creation of a kind of "Maginot line" that, equipped with nuclear strike and interdiction weapons, would reduce to impotence the formidable war machine being built by the USSR.<sup>(3)</sup>

The intent of this article is:

--to explain the "nuclear Maginot line" concept, and

--to examine the technical criticisms that can be advanced in regard to this concept.

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\* The author has already published two articles: "Technical Factors in the 'Counterforces' Strategy" in STRATEGIQUE No 1, and "The Enhanced-Radiation Weapon" in STRATEGIQUE Nos 3,4,5,6 and 7.

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The Nuclear Fortified Line ('The City Walls')

- We will analyze as simply as possible the nuclear Maginot line concept that  
- S.T. Cohen likens to "the city walls" of long ago, but will endeavor throughout  
to respect the intent of its advocates.<sup>(9)</sup>

The latter argue from the following basic premise: Until the advent of the nuclear era, the penetration of all fortified lines has been possible because the attacker could concentrate, on a limited front, a volume of weapons capable of overwhelming the defenders. This fact of military history has changed radically with the advent of the nuclear weapon, because the latter makes it possible to interdict such concentrations.

A Fortified Zone

They propose therefore the establishment of a fortified zone extending the entire length of the border to be defended--a zone made up of an array of basic strongpoints distributed in length and depth along five successive lines, each line approximately 5 km (the order of magnitude of the range of the future third-generation antitank missiles) distant from the preceding line. The total depth of the fortified zone would thus be approximately 20 km.

Along each line, the basic strongpoints would be spaced approximately 500 meters (machine-gun range) apart. These strongpoints would be reinforced concrete bunkers, buried under a thick enough layer of earth to shelter the personnel from the radioactivity released by low-altitude nuclear-warhead bursts,<sup>(10)</sup> including those of enhanced-radiation weapons.

The crew manning each strongpoint--10-12 men--would operate, by remote control, an array of weapons mounted on retractable turrets: automatic-loading antitank rifles; Shillelagh-type missile-launching antitank canon; machine guns and anti-personnel machine-rifles. The detection, vision, identification and aiming equipment would be periscopic devices utilizing the diverse frequency spectra--visible, infrared and millimetric--to provide an equally effective day and night all-weather surveillance and combat capability, despite smoke generators, etc.

The terrain would also be sown with conventional obstacles--barbed wire, antitank ditches, mines, etc--designed to delay the enemy's advance and to augment the time during which the enemy tanks and foot soldiers would be pinned down by fire from the strongpoints and exposed to alarm sensors of all types.

Infantrymen on foot, outside their armored transport vehicles, would be subjected to fire from 3 or 4 strongpoints if within range of the machine guns, from 6 or 7 if covered by the small-caliber automatic rifles, and from 15 to 20 strongpoints in the case of the heavy mortars.

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Nuclear Weapons

Should the enemy attack exceed a certain level of power--not indicated, but the order of magnitude of which might be one or two tank companies,<sup>(11)</sup> possibly reinforced by armored infantry--the authors of this proposal deem that the defense by conventional means should be replaced by enhanced-radiation nuclear-weapons fire. And, as we know, a 1-kt warhead covers substantially a circle whose radius is 0.85 km, that is, an area of 2 km<sup>2</sup>.

The advocates of this defense system estimate at around 5,000, or one weapon per 10 enemy tanks and 10 VCI's [Infantry Combat Vehicles], the number of neutron warheads needed along the Iron Curtain front. They would be delivered by limited-range--a few tens of kilometers<sup>(12)</sup>--but highly accurate launchers. Accuracy would be obtained through data furnished by the strongpoints, but perhaps also through the missile's own terminal guidance system, which would still be dependent upon the strongpoint for laser illumination of the target's center of gravity. This, it seems, would mean using nuclear PGM's (Precision Guided Munitions) such as Copperhead warheads or smart bombs<sup>(13)</sup>; or radar, laser or infrared homing missiles.

As has already been indicated, the personnel manning a strongpoint would be fully sheltered from the radiation, even if the neutron warhead exploded directly over the strongpoint, as the latter would be protected by several meters of concrete and earth.

Radioactive Obstacles

To this system of obstacles and firepower, the authors add an innovative scheme: The natural and artificial obstacles would be supplemented by zones of intensive radioactivity that would interdict the advance of foot troops--infantrymen, sappers--toward strongpoints, slowly but without excessive risk against the strongpoint's conventional weapons, by way of approaches defiladed from view and low-angle fire.

These radioactive zones could be created as needed, using the properties of activated sodium<sup>(14)</sup>. Two methods of activation can be used simultaneously.

The first consists of a priori peacetime sowing of carefully worked out mandatory crossing points and zones with sodium carbonate, and of activating the latter as the need arises, by means of neutrons released by an enhanced-radiation weapon. These zones would then become too radioactive for the enemy to consider sending foot troops through them or stationing armored units in them. If, after a certain time, the radioactivity of the zone is found to have diminished below a certain point, the original level can be restored by exploding another neutron warhead. It will be seen later, however, that in proportion to the quantities of sodium deployed, the fraction rendered radioactive is infinitesimal.

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The second method, which is even more innovative, consists of burying, at relatively great depths not specified by the authors of the proposal, "Dumbos": large metallic vessels built to withstand the /internal/ blast of a 0.1-kt<sup>(15)</sup> nuclear-fusion warhead. These vessels would contain sodium carbonate, apparently in aqueous solution. In case of necessity, the nuclear-fusion warhead would be detonated, the neutrons produced would activate the sodium, forming radioactive Na-24. The radioactive water of this solution would be pumped up to and spread over the terrain. in the zones that are to be denied to the enemy.

A Conventional Forces Complement

Optimistic though they are about the effectiveness of their fortified line, its authors nevertheless assume the possibility of enemy penetrations, though on a very limited scale. The need continues, therefore, for conventional forces to deal with this eventuality--forces essentially built, it would seem, around tank-destroyer-type missiles, that is, relatively light, very mobile missiles armed with a powerful antitank warhead.

The need for ground forces is also assumed by them to deal with air- or helicopter-borne attacks deep inside friendly territory.

The entire array--fortified zone, conventional units, rear territorial zone-- must be covered and supported by sizeable air forces.

Location of the Fortified Zone

This question is at best only briefly addressed by the authors of the proposal. According to them, it would be highly desirable that the NATO defense zone be established in the FRG, along the entire Iron Curtain, a length of about 1,000 km. International agreements, however, prohibit the FRG from producing and freely deploying nuclear weapons of any type whatever. S. T. Cohen has suggested in various articles that, in the alternative, this defense system could be installed by France along its northeastern border, without specifying, however, whether it should be located exclusively on French territory or whether it should be extended beyond the Ardennes along the Benelux borders with the FRG.<sup>(16)</sup>

Critical Analysis

Expropriation of the Fortified Zone

Strictly speaking, and since the "nuclear Maginot line" concept is premised on the enemy's strategic posture and the peremptory hypothesis of a surprise offensive by the Warsaw Pact forces, there could be no question of permitting civilian populations to remain in the fortified zone, since the Allied neutron weapon must be able to be deployed anywhere within the zone, without advance warning and in large numbers, to deal with any surprise attack. This concept therefore presupposes a civilian "no man's land" some 25 km deep along the entire border to be defended.

If, by way of example, we examine the situation in the FRG, such a measure would involve the definitive and permanent evacuation, during peacetime, of numerous

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localities, indeed of large cities such as Lubeck, Wolfsburg, Salzgitter, Gottingen, Cobourg, Hof. This prospect being unacceptable, the remaining alternatives would be either to abandon these densely populated regions to the invader or to defend them by other means.

If we examine the situation in France, where consideration has been given to defense by means of such a system as an adjunct to our strategic deterrent, the problem posed by the expropriation of a fortified zone is analogous mutatis mutandis. Moreover, the deterrent effect of a nuclear Maginot line established on French soil, against a potential attack by the Eastern European countries on the FRG, would be open to some question: In other words, the "tactical deterrent" value (if indeed these two terms can be so combined) would--at best--be of no benefit to any but the country having established it along its entire border; and certainly not to those of its allies whose territory is situated beyond this border, which, with respect to France, would be the case of the FRG and, possibly of the Benelux nations, Italy...

Actually, as was demonstrated by the 1940 invasion, the defense of a border by means of a fortified zone can prove illusory, since the enemy can bypass that zone by simply going through a neutral country. In the case of the FRG, that uncertainty would require that it extend its defenses along the Austrian border, beyond the Bohmerwald to the region opposite Salzburg; that is, 200 km and 5,000 km<sup>2</sup> more to be expropriated.

In the case of France, the fortified line, beginning at the North Sea, would (in the event it were not extended across the Benelux nations) have to run along the entire Swiss border as far as Geneva. Dunkirk, Tourcoing et Roubaix, Sedan, Thionville, Strasbourg, Colmar, Mulhouse, and Pontarlier et Gex, all situated within the fortified zone, would therefore have to be excluded from the defense system if they could not be evacuated...

Vulnerabilities of the Fortified Zone

The authors of the plan, assume that this fortified system, like any other, can be pierced locally. S.T. Cohen estimates that around 150,000 men would suffice to seal up any breaks of limited size and respond to rear-area air- or helicopter-borne enemy actions--even though the USSR currently has 8 airborne divisions.

The reasoning may be summarized as follows:

--the firepower of each strongpoint would be amply sufficient to enable it to withstand, by its own means, any loose-formation attacks;

--any large enemy concentration would be dealt with by enhanced-radiation weapons fire;

--any attempts at secret infiltration by foot troops--infantry or sappers--would be doomed to failure in zones rendered artificially radioactive;

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--and lastly, a knockout breach by means of massive nuclear fire is inconceivable, since, to destroy the buried strongpoints, the enemy would have to resort to ground bursts that would produce, around the craters, an intensive radioactivity that would prevent entirely the passage of his armor and, even more so, that of his foot troops.

But this reasoning, based on the attacker's nuclear capabilities, takes no account of his conventional capabilities in the form of highly effective, even though not nuclear, conventional missiles in his arsenal. Actually, the stopping power of the strongpoints depends not only on the nature of their weapons, but also on their ability to use them. As has been mentioned above, the deeply buried position of the strongpoint crews requires, at the surface, means of surveillance, observation and aiming that must be operational at all times and under all conditions (day, night, fog, etc) and that must use all imaginable techniques: visible light, infrared, electromagnetic detection (radars), etc.

All of these systems have in common their fragility. The enemy could thus breach the fortified zone by means of non-nuclear bombardments designed to destroy these sensors. Blinded, the defensive strongpoints would be deprived of their combat capability, hence neutralized.

The sensors could be destroyed in several ways.

In fact, the use of explosive aerosol cloud missiles by the enemy against inherently fragile targets cannot be excluded from consideration.<sup>(17)</sup>

It appears, therefore, that the attacker, provided he commits weapons in sufficient number and suited to the breaching of fortified zones, could create large gaps in it without having to resort to nuclear weapons.<sup>(18)</sup>

These breaches accomplished, the invader could then commit his armored units in accordance with nuclear dispersion levels. The disappearance of the local ground observation system would render much more difficult for the defender the use of his neutron weapons against the attacking units (with spy satellites destroyed or blinded and the defender's manifest air inferiority leaving the latter hopelessly deprived of means of reconnaissance... In any case, the time delays involved in analysis of the data furnished by orbiting or airborne systems appear hardly compatible with the accuracy demanded, in terms of time and space, by the effective range of enhanced-radiation weapons).

At this point, according to S.T. Cohen's plan, the defender could resort to his tank-destroyer units to try to stem the enemy advance. The evaluation of the number of units required to stop the thousands of enemy tanks and VCI's that would exploit the breach seems very low, however, considering that the total strength of this conventional component, charged also with fighting against potential airborne rear-area operations, would not exceed around 150,000 men.<sup>(19)</sup>

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Artificial Radioactive Zones

This brings us to the most innovative of the plan's concepts, that of infiltration zones interdicted by the presence of activated sodium irradiated with neutron warheads. We must confess from the outset that this idea leaves us somewhat perplexed, since elementary calculations seem to indicate that this system of defense can be but very limitedly effective.

We must assume, of course, that the sodium carbonate will have been put in place during peacetime, since the basis of the fortified zone concept is the response to a surprise attack. The presence of sodium-23 is intended to substantially enhance the activation of the ground's component substances under irradiation by the neutrons released by nuclear explosions. This effect is labeled under the acronym NIGA (Neutron Induced Ground Activation) (20) by the Anglo-Saxons.

Very roughly speaking, two methods of activation may be used:

--either a low-altitude burst, at around 100-150 m, to produce strong irradiation intensities at ground zero and its immediate vicinity,


--or raise the altitude and "power" of the explosion--for example, to some 300-400 m--to obtain an activation whose decay would be less rapid with increasing distance from ground zero, but which at ground zero itself would be weaker than in the first alternative unless a relatively more powerful warhead is used.

Which are we to choose? We know that the fast neutron flux diminishes with distance in accordance with a law in terms of  $1/R^2 \times \exp(-R/235)$ . If, all other things being equal, we compare the activations produced at ground zero by a warhead exploding at an altitude of 100 m with those by an explosion at 300 m, we find that the ratio of possible activations at ground zero is 21 to 1 in favor of the low-altitude explosion. The issue thus appears settled in favor of medium-altitude -- 100-150m -- bursts, since the energy of the neutron warhead would have to be increased considerably to obtain effects analogous to those of high-altitude -- 300-400 m -- bursts. (21)

Figure 5 refers to a warhead burst at a height of 100 m. The activation is plotted as a function of distance, /in terms of relative values/ with respect to its value at ground zero, since its absolute values would depend on the composition of the terrain: various natural terrains or terrains doped by irrigation with sodium carbonate.

We note that activation drops to 1/10 of ground zero width at 140 m from ground zero, and to 1/100 at around 310 m.

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A first objection to the concept seems to arise immediately. Sodium carbonate is a water-soluble substance.<sup>(22)</sup> One might think, therefore, that if put in place during peacetime, it would be diluted rapidly by rain. In fact, if the quantity distributed is sufficient and if the terrain is not extremely impermeable, a substantial fraction of the carbonate dissolved by rainwater will settle into the upper layers of the surface soil. The chances are, however, that little by little it will be further diluted and carried down to such depth as will require new distributions, the periodicity of which, to be determined by soil analyses, must be evaluated in terms of months at least, and more probably in terms of years.

We note, nevertheless, that the solubility of sodium carbonate constitutes a factor in its favor for the proposed purpose. Actually, the cross section of Na-23 is 0.56 barn for thermal neutrons, that is, neutrons slowed to an energy level corresponding to the ambient temperature. But, for 14-MeV fusion-neutrons, this cross section is less than 0.001 barn. Consequently, if the  $\text{Na}_2\text{CO}_3$  remains at the surface, each sodium atom would have but an infinitesimally low probability of being activated: The neutrons would pass through the carbonate layer practically without producing activation. (We will encounter this problem again with regard to the Dumbos). The soil's water content thermalizes the neutrons, thus tending to augment the cross section and to favor the process sought by the advocates of the defense system.

Let us now examine the quantity of radioactive sodium that could be produced.

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We know that a 1-kt fusion reaction releases  $1.42 \times 10^{24}$  neutrons. If each of these neutrons were to activate one atom of Na-23, the mass of Na-24 produced would be

$$24 \times \frac{1.42 \times 10^{24}}{6.02 \times 10^{23}} = 56.6 \text{ grams (23).}$$

This quantity might seem small, but it represents an initial radioactivity of close to 500,000,000 curies<sup>(24)</sup>. Actually, the quantity of Na-24 created is much less, for the following reasons:

--It may be assumed that the warhead includes a neutron reflector that directs the neutrons earthwards. We know that no perfect reflector exists. Nevertheless, if one can obtain that 70 or 80 percent of the neutrons be well directed earthwards, this cause of loss of yield may be considered negligible in proportion to the others;

--During their transit between the point of explosion and earth, a substantial number of neutrons is captured by the air (exp d/235 law), with emission of 6-MeV gamma rays that will not take part in the activation. This phenomenon was taken into account in plotting the curve of Figure 5.

Lastly, and above all, the sodium is "diluted" among the ground's constituent substances. Generally speaking, it will capture only a very small proportion of the neutrons: The vast majority of the latter will be absorbed by these natural components of the terrain, since they are present in vastly greater proportion than the carbonate.

By way of example, let us suppose that sufficient sodium carbonate has been spread to ensure a concentration of 100 grams per m<sup>2</sup> throughout the first 30 cm of soil (that is, 100 tons per km<sup>2</sup>).

These 100 g of Na<sub>2</sub>CO<sub>3</sub> correspond to 43 g of sodium-23 (sole stable isotope). Now, these same 30 cm of depth per m<sup>2</sup>, a volume of 0.3 m<sup>3</sup> represent a mass of the order of 450 kg of earth, which is approximately 10,000 times the weight of sodium.

Let us assume a clayey-type terrain (of the kaolin type). Its chemical formula will be very close to Si<sub>2</sub>Al<sub>2</sub>O<sub>5</sub>(OH)<sub>4</sub> (pure kaolinite). A simple calculation shows that this soil contains some 2,000 atoms of silicon and the same amount again of aluminum for each atom of sodium.

It should now be taken into account that natural silicon is composed of several isotopes of which only one, Si-30, whose isotopic abundance is 3.1 percent, produces a radioactive isotope, Si-31, through neutronic irradiation.

Based on the common-capture cross sections of the proportionate amounts of the different substances, it is clear that for each atom of sodium Na-24 activated, 750 of Al-28 and 12 of Si-31 will also be activated. Moreover, 380 atoms of Si-28 and Si-29 will absorb one neutron, but without producing an activated substance.<sup>(25)</sup> The question then arises: Will the activated aluminum and silicon add significant effects to those of the sodium?

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The period of activated aluminum (Al-28) is only 2.3 minutes, meaning it drops to 1/1,000 of its initial value in 23 minutes and to 1/1,000,000 in 46 minutes; it is therefore negligible. At each disintegration, Al-28 emits one 2.86-MeV beta ray and one 1.78-MeV gamma ray.

For silicon, the period of Si-31 is 2.7 hours. It emits a 1.48-MeV beta ray and a 1.26-MeV gamma ray, but, for the latter, only in the proportion of 0.07 percent (7/10,000) of the disintegrations. Now, emitted /in the soil/, the beta rays are absorbed by it, and only the very scarcely emitted gamma rays need be taken into account for the calculation of the irradiation of troops crossing the activated zone. Of course, the beta rays emitted by the sodium must also be disregarded for this purpose.

Thus, and after some tens of minutes, the dangerous radiations are the only gammas being emitted, in their relative initial ratios of

--2 for the sodium (2 gammas per disintegration)

--and  $\frac{12 \times 0.07}{100} = 0.0084$  for the silicon,

or 240 times less for the silicon. Moreover, the periods of these two substances being respectively 15 hours (Na-24) and 2.7 hours (Si-31), the very weak concentration of the latter diminishes rapidly.

In sum, the irradiation of combatants crossing the zone under consideration will be owing essentially to the sodium-24 coming from its isotope 23 activated by the neutrons. The values indicated above show that this would still be the case if the quantity of carbonate distributed over the terrain had been 100 times less than the one we assumed, that is, if it had been only 1 g per m<sup>2</sup> (1 ton per km<sup>2</sup>).

Kaolin-type clay is, however, far from being the only kind of terrain one is likely to encounter. One might well question whether the foregoing conclusions would still hold regardless of type of soil.

Actually, rather than seek to examine what the combination of sodium carbonate with all the other imaginable types of terrain would produce--which would be a prodigious effort of painstaking scholarship--it is simpler to examine what the neutronic bombardment of the principal components of the various soils would give.

This examination is summarized in the tabulation that follows, in which:

--we have eliminated the elements that appear only rarely and solely in the form of traces--gold, titanium, tellurium, etc--which eliminates the vast majority of the 92 natural elements, insofar as concerns the soils found in Europe;

--for each of the elements studied, we have included only the natural isotopes which, by neutronic irradiation, produce a radioactive isotope;

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--the indicated cross section is that relative to the thermal neutrons (0.025 eV) (26);

--we have not included elements such as hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, and carbon, either because their cross section is extremely small (O-16), or because their gamma emission is immediate (N-14), or because the isotope formed is not radioactive.

(1) Isotope naturel	(2) % dans élément naturel	(3) Section efficace de capture (barns)	(4) Radio- isotope formé	(5) Période du radio- isotope	(6) Raies gamma	
					Energie (Mev.) (7)	% par désinté- gration (8)
<sup>23</sup> Na 11	100 %	0,56	<sup>24</sup> Na 11	14,05 h	1,37 2,75	100 100
<sup>26</sup> Mg 12	11,3 %	0,05	<sup>27</sup> Mg 12	9,45 mn	0,84 1,015	70 30
<sup>27</sup> Al 13	100 %	0,21	<sup>28</sup> Al 13	2,3 mn	1,78	100
<sup>30</sup> Si 14	3,12 %	0,11	<sup>31</sup> Si 14	2,65 h	1,26	0,07
<sup>41</sup> K 19	0,0 %	1	<sup>42</sup> K 19	12,47 h	1,53	13
<sup>40</sup> Ca 20	0,185 %	1,1	<sup>49</sup> Ca 20	9,8 mn	3,10 4,05 4,66	80 10 1
<sup>58</sup> Fe 26	0,31 %	0,9	<sup>56</sup> Fe 26	45 j	0,19 1,10 1,29	2,8 57 43

## Key:

1. Natural isotope.
2. Percent in natural element.
3. Cross section (barns).
4. Radioisotope formed.
5. Period of radioisotope.
6. Gamma rays.
7. Energy (MeV).
8. Percent per disintegration.

The above table easily explains why the induced activity is particularly higher in terrains that contain sodium, present either as a natural component of its rock (27), or purposely distributed, for example in the form of carbonate as proposed by the authors of the system:

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--magnesium has very little effect, owing to its low percentage of isotope 26, its small cross section and short period;

--aluminum has a very short period;

--silicon-30 is present only in the proportion of 3 percent and produces a gamma ray only in 7 disintegrations per 10,000.

--potassium-41 is present only in the proportion of 6.9 percent; less than 1 disintegration in 5 produces a gamma ray;

--isotope 48 of calcium is present only to the extent of less than 0.2 percent and the period of the Ca-49 formed is very brief;

--lastly, isotope 58 of iron represents only 0.3 percent of the element present and its period is relatively very long (radioactivity persistent, but weak).

Of course, there are elements in existence that, for this purpose, would yield an induced activity far superior to that obtainable from sodium. Unfortunately, they are very rare substances in nature, whose prices are such as to preclude any thought of using them. Gold, for example, would be far more "viable" than sodium. Its natural isotope, Au-197, is unique (100 percent isotopic abundance); its cross section is 100 barns; and it forms Au-198, whose period is 2.7 days, and which emits a 0.41-MeV gamma ray at every disintegration.


Although the choice of sodium carbonate thus seems justified, a question of capital importance now arises: To what irradiation would troops crossing a zone in which this induced activity of sodium had been produced be subjected? The response to this question must enable an assessment of the /military value/ of the system being proposed by S. T. Cohen. With this in mind, we return to the case of a terrain containing in its upper layers 100 g of sodium carbonate per m<sup>2</sup>, subjected to the effects of a 1-kt fusion-neutron warhead exploded at a height of 100 m. We have assumed this warhead to be equipped with a reflector and that the absorption by the materials comprising the warhead is low, the overall assembly permitting 80 percent of the neutrons formed to be directed to earth.

Figure 6 -- which is merely a transposition of Figure 5 -- gives the initial dosage yield as a function of distance from ground zero.

It will be noted that dosage yields are large in the immediate vicinity of ground zero, but over a very limited area. Calculation easily shows that personnel circulating on foot, at a speed of 4.5 km/hr and passing directly over ground zero, would receive a dosage of only 4.8 rads. In tanks, with a protection coefficient of 5 and at a speed of 20 km/hr, the dosage received drops to less than 0.2 rads. These figures are valid immediately following the activating explosion, but, let us recall, they diminish by half 15 hours after the explosion, by three quarters 30 hours after, etc.



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## Key:

1. Initial yield in rads/hr.
2. Ground zero.
3. Distance from ground zero

/The dosages involved would thus be too low to interdict attacking forces, even on foot, from crossing the activated zones/. A substantially higher level of radioactivity could be obtained, however, in two ways, since this radioactivity is practically proportional :

--to the quantity of sodium present per  $m^2$ ;

--to the energy of the neutron warhead used to produce the activation.

Theoretically, the first way is easy: We have presupposed a minimum net distribution within the soil of 100 g of sodium carbonate per  $m^2$ , which, allowing for the quantity washed away by rain, could represent an initial distribution of around 500 g per  $m^2$ . A tenfold increase in the activity we have thus assumed could be obtained by an initial distribution of around 5 kg of carbonate per  $m^2$ . But this would represent 5,000 tons per  $km^2$ , meaning that if only 1/100 of the 25,000  $km^2$  of fortified zone must be activatable, 1,250,000 tons of sodium carbonate must be used; this represents works and expenditures on a considerable scale, and, as we have said above, would have to be renewed periodically. A minimum net concentration of some 100 g of carbonate per  $m^2$  therefore seems a reasonable value: It would require the distribution of 500,000 tons to prepare for the artificial activation of 1/50 of the fortified zone.

The second way seems to offer greater possibilities upon first analysis. Actually, if instead of a 1-kt fusion warhead we had assumed warheads of 2, 5 or 10 kt, the activations would have been twice, five times, or 10 times greater, respectively. Let us note, however, that explosion at a rigorously exact height of 100 m cannot

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be taken for granted--far from it! And in the event that a malfunction in the detonation system were to set off the explosion at ground level or too close to it, the phenomenon of nuclear fallout would be inevitable. Now, we know (cf. STRATEGIQUE No 4) that 1 kt of fusion energy involves blast energy corresponding to that of a 0.5-kt fission warhead--ignition by fission plus the blast energy of fusion. Thus, the fallout from a 1-kt fusion warhead, in a sheltered area, corresponds to that from a 0.5-kt fission bomb, and that from 2-, 5- and 10-kt fusion warheads to that from 1-, 2.5- and 5-kt fission bombs, levels that are far from being negligible.(28)

We will assume that it would not be reasonable to use activation warheads of fusion energy exceeding 5 kt at low altitudes of 100 m.(29)

Under these conditions, the ordinates of the curve of Figure 6 must be multiplied by 5, as well as the dosages we have calculated. These would become:

--24 rads for foot troops;

--1 rad for tank crews.

These are still small dosages that are not likely to involve physiological problems that would prevent these troops from accomplishing their mission.

/In conclusion, the artificial activation of terrain by prior placement of sodium carbonate and the explosion of a neutron warhead at the opportune time appears to us to offer very little of military value/, and we feel we can say that it would be far more viable to use those warheads against targets, that is, directly on concentrations of forces.

The Dumbo Method

As we have said, the system calls for irradiating sodium carbonate by means of a very-low-energy (0.1-kt fusion) fusion warhead, the whole being placed inside a reservoir whose dimensions and ability to withstand overpressures would ensure its tightness. The irradiated carbonate in water solution is then pumped up and distributed over the surface of the zones to be interdicted.

Its authors provide no detailed description of the proposed system. It is possible, however, on the basis of simple reasoning, to arrive at a rough approximation of its make-up.


The first fact to be noted is that the probable /direct/ action of the fusion neutrons on the sodium would be very mild (a cross section of less than 1 millibarn for neutrons at 14 MeV).(30) From a practical standpoint, it would appear necessary to surround the fusion warhead with a light vessel containing the sodium carbonate in a "common" (light water) aqueous solution that would serve as a moderator to reduce the neutron energy level to the proper value. The cross section then becomes 0.56 barn for the sodium; it remains small for the other substances present: oxygen, hydrogen, carbon.

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Calculation--based on some simplifying assumptions--gives us, for the proportion of neutrons absorbed, as a function of the thickness of the sodium carbonate (saturated solution), the results shown in Figure 7.


The curve reaches a maximum of a little over 60 percent at theoretically infinite thickness, but a practical maximum is reached at a thickness of the order of 1.5 m.



## Key:

1. Percent neutrons absorbed by the Na-23.
2. Thickness of  $\text{Na}_2\text{CO}_3$  in solution.

The Dumbo system could then take a form somewhat like the one diagramed in Figure 8, in which, for the sake of clarity, components are not drawn to scale.



## Key:

1. Sprinkler or irrigation system.
2. "DUMBO" (steel sphere)
3.  $\text{Na}_2\text{CO}_3$  solution.
4. 0.1-kt fusion warhead.
5. Standby pump.

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From the center outward, we show:

--a 1-kt fusion-energy neutron warhead;

--a hollow shell, whose thickness is of the order of 1 m, containing the sodium carbonate in aqueous solution;

--the Dumbo, a steel hollow sphere. Calculation shows that this sphere can withstand the peak overpressure of the explosion if, for a radius of 20 m, its thickness is of the order of some 30 cm.

The assembly includes discharge piping for the activated carbonate solution, and a standby pumping device: If the irrigation takes place immediately following the explosion, the pressure inside the Dumbo would be sufficient to force the solution out without the use of pumping equipment. At the surface, irrigation could take a form somewhat like the giant sprinklers used in agriculture. It must be noted, however, that these systems must be capable of withstanding the blast from nearby conventional explosions.

Let us now calculate the level of radioactivity to be expected from this process.

The 0.1-kt fusion explosion releases  $1.4 \times 10^{23}$  neutrons. Allowing for absorption losses in the warhead components and in the carbonate solution water, and for leakage, the percentage of neutrons captured would be slightly less than it might appear from Figure 7. We will assume a value of 50 percent "usable" neutrons, in which case:

$$1.4 \times 10^{23} \times 0.5 = 7 \times 10^{22}$$

atoms of radioactive Na-24 would be formed, whose initial activity would be:

$$\frac{7 \times 10^{22}}{1.44 \times 15 \times 3600} \times \frac{1}{3.7 \times 10^{10}} = 2.5 \times 10^7 \text{ curies.}$$

It is known that the dosage rate delivered by a surface contamination of the ground, at a height of 1 m above ground, is 13 rads/hr/curie  $\times$  Mev/m<sup>2</sup>. The Na-24 releases at each disintegration 2 gamma rays of energy at 1.37 and 2.75 Mev, respectively.

For 1 curie per m<sup>2</sup>, therefore, at 1 m above ground, the initial dosage rate would be:

$$(1.37 \times 2.75) \times 13 = 54 \text{ rads/hr.}$$

If we assume, for example, that the irrigation equipment is able to cover an area of  $250 \times 250 \text{ m}^2$ , each m<sup>2</sup> would receive an average of  $2.5 \times 10^7 \div 62,500 = 400$  curies, and the initial rate of irradiation would be:

$$54 \times 400 = 21,600 \text{ rads/hr.}$$

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A foot troop crossing this zone at 5 km/hr would receive a dosage of:

$$\frac{21,000 \times 250}{5,000} = 1,080 \text{ rads (assured lethal effects).}$$

In tanks, at 20 km/hr and assuming a protection coefficient of 5 provided by its armor, the dosage would not exceed 54 rads.

15 and 30 hours later, these dosages would not exceed, respectively, 540 and 27 rads, and 270 and 13.5 rads.

From a practical standpoint, /the proposed Dumbo system appears fully capable of denying passage to a foot troop over a period of well over 1 day. But this interdiction would be valid over a very limited area (around 1/4 km<sup>2</sup>), and this type of system could be justified only around very special points, because of its cost./

Actually, even putting aside the cost of the neutron warhead and of the ancillary devices--carbonated water vessel, contaminated water discharge and dispersion system -- the problem of fabricating and of the putting in place of the Dumbo remains.

In the first place, a steel sphere of 20-m radius and 30-cm thickness of shell could not be built in a shop then transported to the site, because of its volume and weight--around 12,000 tons. The only practical method of fabrication would consist of preparing sections of this sphere--for example, 120 sections of 100 tons each--in a shop and transporting them to the pre-excavated site--an excavation of the order of 50,000 m<sup>3</sup> if the top of the Dumbo is to be some 20 meters below the surface of the terrain--where the 120 sectors would be welded to each other. But the welding of spherical plates some 30 cm thick is a difficult operation, particularly in a natural open-air environment; and we would be apt to suspect the reliability of these welds a priori.

Another method of building the Dumbos, undoubtedly easier, given the special conditions involved, might be to construct the vessel out of post-stressed concrete, as is done in France for the G2 and G3 graphite-gas reactors, which should be able to withstand indefinitely a carbonic gas pressure of 15 kg/cm<sup>2</sup>.

Although easier to build than a steel Dumbo under the conditions cited, a cylinder 20 m in diameter and 26 m long, approximately, represents a civil engineering project of the magnitude comparable to that of a high-powered nuclear reactor vessel and would involve considerable expenditures if it were to be installed by the hundreds.

We will pass over such details as:

--the removal of the debris displaced by the volume of the Dumbo;

--the need for a permanent access to the neutron warhead for the periodic replacement of the tritium.

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In any case, however, the work of building Dumbos could not be carried with even a bare minimum of secrecy--with any more secrecy, moreover, than the building of conventional defensive strongpoints.

This means that the entire system, clearly displayed over the terrain, could not hope to be ignored by the potential enemy--information would be obtainable through oblique air photography, satellites and agents--to the extent of his not having a perfect knowledge, dating back to peacetime, of the detailed organization of the fortified zone, the bombardments he must plan in advance to breach it, and the contaminated zones to be avoided, at least by his foot troops.

Conclusion

Would the existence of a nuclear Maginot line have the interdictory effects claimed for it by its advocates? We think not, in that this gigantic "Walls of the City" appears to us to be far from invulnerable, to the extent that the attacker were willing to pay the price of breaching it, both as regards men and equipment.

The French view of the problem must necessarily differ from NATO's, if only from the twofold standpoint of the relationship of the forces involved and of the cost of a nuclear Maginot line. We have felt impelled, however, to offer our comments of a technical nature, which are merely based on elementary common sense and which we summarize as follows:

A. The proposed fortified line could not be considered invulnerable--a fact that is implicitly admitted by its advocates, in that they consider necessary a combat component--too small a one in our opinion--to deal with potential breaches. We credit the fortified zone, however, with the fact that attacking it would require such a heavy concentration of firepower as to reveal clearly the area in which the enemy planned to carry out his breaching attack. But the problem of closing a considerable area to all peacetime activity remains.

B. The use of enhanced-radiation weapons by the defender would enable the latter to attack all enemy concentrations within the fortified zone without running the risk of destroying the strongpoint's own sensor-collectors--provided the latter are designed proof against irradiation--whereas tactical nuclear weapons of the conventional type could be devastating because of their blast effects. The deep underground sheltering of the personnel also ensures their ability to continue the firing of their neutron weapons even directly over their own strongpoint, should this kind of firing prove necessary.

C. As a reminder, we reiterate the fact that the size of the proposed combat component to deal with potential breaches appears to us highly inadequate. If the enemy were to succeed in opening a breach some tens of kilometers in length--which it appears would be within his capability--the tank-destroyers of a force of 150,000 men could not possibly hope to stop the thousands of combat tanks, escorted by infantry combat vehicles in similar numbers, which the potential enemy could deploy, from pouring through after the breaching of the fortified system.

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D. It is surprising to note that S.T. Cohen and his school appear not to have taken into account whatever the fact that the Eastern European countries have a fantastic stock--300,000-700,000 tons, according to information reaching the West--of poison-gas munitions. The West as a whole, in fact, appears not to have accorded much attention to this threat until the recent events in Afghanistan.

Of course, it may be assumed that the bunker crews of the fortified line would be protected by way of air-supply equipment capable of filtering the poison gases: this type of equipment is already installed in modern armored vehicles. Alarm systems must still be provided, however, since the filter system could not remain in permanent use without rapid impairment of the protective capabilities of its filters (through moist air especially).

For the combat component, protective gear already exists, and is in the hands of the units; gas masks (ANP: Normal Protective Apparatus, in the jargon of the specialists); protective hoods and coveralls against the use of percutaneous-type substances; boots and overshoes; and special gloves. Nevertheless, the alert must be sounded immediately and the personnel must be /perfectly trained/ to don their protective equipment very rapidly: The noxiousness of modern poison gases (organo-phosphorus) has nothing whatever in common with that of the gases used in World War I. A typical surprise attack consists of deploying a concentration of poison gas such that any personnel not protected within some 30 seconds will, at the very least, be put out of combat. This is a very short time in which to detect the presence of gases, sound the alert (from which point on the breath must be held), remove one's helmet, release the mask from its case, adjust it on one's face and secure the holding straps. As fast as possible thereafter, the rest of the protective gear must be donned, for, detection does not necessarily indicate whether the poisonous substance is one of those that acts through the skin.

Now, although, as we have said, the Western armed forces are equipped with this protective gear, the civilian populations are totally devoid of it; more so even than in 1939, for, at that time, the inhabitants of large cities were issued masks capable of protecting them against the then-known toxic gases. The fact is that the possibility of a massive attack on the conventional combat forces charged with responding to breaches of the fortified line cannot be excluded. It would produce substantial losses among them, which would diminish their combat capability but without necessarily annulling it. On the other hand, however, no matter how little the meteorological conditions might lend themselves to it (wind relative light, cool weather, temperature gradient negative, that is, cooler air at ground level than at a height of a few meters--conditions that are quite common in the very early morning hours), these attacks could bring death to hundreds of thousands, indeed millions, of civilians. Conventional and nuclear missiles produce their effects only in the zone surrounding their point of drop. Poison gases, on the other hand, after having produced their effect on the military target involved, remain subject to unpredictable weather factors. They can still be highly dangerous at distances as great (in case of "favorable" weather) as several tens of kilometers from the point at which they were released: One might say they are deployed by two successive vehicles: the projectile--bomb, shell, rocket, etc--then, the wind.

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What are the reasons for the West's profound ignorance or indifference with regard to the enormous capabilities of the Warsaw Pact forces in toxic substances? What would be the reaction of the media and of public opinion in general if the governments of Western Europe were to decide to produce poison-gas munitions as a deterrent to their use by the Eastern European nations in case of conflict?

The above considerations notwithstanding, which we must recognize are not very favorable to the concept of the "nuclear Maginot line," we are compelled to underscore the fact that the latter's advocates have helped to highlight two other--in our view, essential--concepts that Europe must take into account to assure its survival.

The first, which S.T. Cohen and his friends are not the only ones to support, as we have seen, has to do with the fact that NATO's structures, the deployment of its forces and that of its logistic means are, in peacetime, very poorly adapted to the growing risks of a surprise attack, including a nuclear one, by the Pact forces. Henceforth, the concept of forward-area operations, which can be assumed only in the case of the FRG, cannot be considered unless the deployment of the large Allied units is such as to enable them to enter into action in their respective sectors with the least delay possible: from a practical standpoint, only if they are virtually already in place in peacetime.

We will not dwell on logistical matters, specifically on munitions and fuel dumps, except to underscore that tactical nuclear munitions should be made as minimally vulnerable as possible to a preemptive enemy strike.

Lastly, there is the problem of a response to strikes by toxic weapons...

The second concept, it must be recognized, seems to have been somewhat neglected to date by the political leaders and their military subordinates: For Europe, an armed conflict with Eastern Europe can only be defensive. /It would have to take place therefore on Western European soil/. The fact is that throughout the 30 years that the threat has existed, the potential for adapting this terrain to facilitate its defense have hardly been exploited. Examples of lacunae in this regard are too numerous to permit citing them all. We will limit ourselves to mentioning, among other things, that:

--whereas the number of superhighways has multiplied, and the road network has been considerably improved, nothing has been done to render their use by the forces of an invader impossible, or at least more difficult;

--urban development plans have taken into account everything except the use of localities to facilitate defensive operations;

--the development of forests that would be easy to defend--if need be, by nuclear firepower that would make of them inescapable slaughterhouses--has not been pursued, although it could contribute to discouraging an enemy from exploiting the facilities being offered him by the vast northern European plain.

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Of course, the prior booby-trapping of an area would involve a style of operations that undoubtedly differs from the one in vogue in Western military academies. Being no experts in this domain, we yield it to our tactics-minded readers for further comment, hoping the sentry still standing guard over the City Walls will not have to shout the old cry of alarm: "They're here!"

FOOTNOTES

1. See 1970/1980 edition of "Military Balance" (International Institute for Strategic Studies, London).
2. The reader will find critiques in this regard in:
  - Van Cleave and S. T. Cohen: "Tactical Nuclear Weapons: An Examination of the Issues."
  - D. G. Brennan: "The Neutron Bomb Controversy," in Hudson Institute Paper, 3 April 1978, reference number: H.I. 2733/2P.
  - Very briefly summarized in conclusions of the debate organized by LE FIGARO, published under the title: "1980-1990: Europe Gambles on Its Survival" in its 19 November 1979 issue.
3. See for example:
  - Samuel T. Cohen and Marc Geneste: "Echec a la guerre" [Checkmate to War], 1979, Editions Copernic;
  - The many articles that appeared in the daily newspapers and weekly magazines toward the end of Spring 1980, when the issue was "in vogue" -- a campaign preceded by a very brief survey of the "City Walls" concept by S. T. Cohen in the 10 October 1979 issue of the daily l'AUREOLE: "A New Chance for Maginot."
9. We have taken the technical details from the aforementioned books and articles by S. T. Cohen.
10. Explosions at altitudes just above contaminating altitudes; that is, at heights such that the fireball will not touch the ground. We recall that, for "conventional" nuclear weapons, this height is given by the formula:  
$$H \geq 55 \times W^{0.4}$$
  
H being in meters and W in kilometers (cf. STRATEGIQUE, No 1: "Technical Bases of Counterforces Strategy").
11. That is, 10-20 tanks, reinforced by some 10 infantry armored combat vehicles. This norm is of course debatable and represents only an order of magnitude. It must not be forgotten, however, that the Warsaw Pact forces' infantry combat vehicles are more and more becoming devices equipped with a canon (73-mm) and an antitank-missile-launching ramp, perfectly usable against the retractable turrets of the defenders. (Vehicles of types BMP 1, BMD, etc.).

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12. In "Echec a la guerre," S. T. Cohen and Marc Geneste evoke also the long-range launchers: presumably, SNLE [Nuclear Missile-Launching Submarine] missiles. Allowing for the small, but not entirely null, probability of navigational error of the submarine and that of the missile, the accuracy of delivery--the CEP [circle of equal probability]--could be 300-400 m, which is excessive for the purposes of the neutron weapon. Besides, it hardly appears justified to use precious multiple-strategic-capability (multiple-warhead) MSBS's to destroy some 20 tanks and infantry armored vehicles, or even SSBS's, which are every bit as precious.
  13. Shells (155-mm for the Copperhead) or aircraft-borne bombs equipped with sensors and devices that enable the missile to modify its ballistic trajectory to home in with a high degree of accuracy on its target to the extent the latter can be "illuminated" by a laser beam emitted from an aircraft or a ground observation point. These missiles must be distinguished from those of the future generation, called "Fire and Forget," which are fully self-homing.
  14. More exactly, a sodium salt: its carbonate  $\text{Na}_2\text{CO}_3$ . The choice of sodium is based on the following two considerations. The first is that the radioactive decay of the activated substance must be neither too slow nor too fast, for:
    - if it is too slow, the radioactivity persists for a very long time but its intensity is too low for military purposes (for example, stationing on granitic terrain -- 200-400 millirems/yr -- presents no danger;
    - if it is very rapid, the intensity is high initially, but diminishes very fast and is no longer dangerous after too short a time.The second consideration is that the substance to be used in this defense system must be sufficiently abundant in nature so that its cost will not be excessive. Its neutron cross section must be large.
- These constraints leave very little choice outside of sodium-23, an abundantly available natural element which becomes radioactive under neutronic bombardment. Sodium-24, an emitter of gamma rays, has a half-life of 15 hours: its radioactivity diminishes by half in 15 hours, by three-quarters in 30 hours, by seven-eighths in 45 hours, etc. It decays to 1/1000 in 150 hours, or 6 days, and to 1/1,000,000 in 12 days.
15. Or, if our evaluations in Nos 3 and 4 of STRATEGIQUE ("The Enhanced-Radiation Weapon," first and second parts) were substantially correct, a total energy of 0.13 kt--0.10 kt for the fusion alone, and 0.03 kt for the detonation by fission--producing, as a whole, the blast effects of a conventional fission weapon of 0.054 kt.
  16. Although not indicated, the number of neutron warheads needed would still be of the order of 5,000 (or slightly less allowing for enemy losses during combat in the FRG), since this number is not dependent upon the length of border to be defended, but upon the number of enemy tanks and VCI's to be stopped.

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17. These are FAE [Fuel Air Explosive] munitions, the technology of which has been developed in the United States: The combustion in air of a given mass of hydrocarbon yields 10 times as much energy as the explosion of an equal mass of conventional explosive. First, the missile produces a cloud of hydrocarbon over the target; then, this cloud is ignited and detonated.

Actually, the hydrocarbon is not a conventional one. And, in practice, the dispersion is not perfect and the energy ratio obtained, as between equal masses of dispersed substance and conventional explosive, is of the order of 5 to 1. To this energy differential must be added the fact that, although the overpressure created by the explosion of a conventional missile is very high at the point of explosion, it diminishes very rapidly with distance, whereas, in the case of the explosive cloud, the overpressure is practically constant throughout the zone covered by the cloud: It drops only outside the area covered by the aerosol and, for equal energy, its effects at ground level are greatly enhanced, since it is its blast effect that is operative and not that of its burst.

18. For a zone consisting of five successive lines, 10 strongpoints must be neutralized per kilometer of length of the penetration: this means around 500 for a 50-km breakthrough of the front. We note that the standard strongpoint the authors have in mind is not described in detail. They assign to it, however, a crew of some 10 men, which leads us to believe its dimensions are not very large; and its sensor-collectors could probably all be destroyed by a single lucky FAE-type missile hit, or by several guided missiles of conventional explosives.
19. The number of tank-destroyers is not indicated in the mentioned references.
20. Some Anglo-Saxon authors use the acronym NIGA for "Neutron Induced Gamma Activation." The latter term seems to us too restrictive, in that the acronym itself is always used in relation to the effects produced on the ground; and the activation of the substances comprising the ground produces, in addition to gamma rays, beta rays as well.
21. Ground explosion has been excluded: It would no longer involve artificial activation of the terrain, but rather radioactive fallout around and under the air over the crater dug by the weapon.
22. Very soluble in the case of neutral carbonate,  $\text{Na}_2\text{CO}_3$ , which is the proposed substance, and a little less for its acid carbonate  $\text{NaHCO}_3$ . But the former contains 56 g of sodium for 116 g of substance, and the latter only 23 g for 84 g.
23.  $6.02 \times 10^{23}$  (Avogadro's number) atoms of an element of atomic mass M weigh M grams.

..23..

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24. 1 curie:  $3.7 \times 10^{10}$  disintegrations per second. Each disintegration of an Na-24 nucleus produces an emission of:
- one 1.4-MeV electron (beta ray);
  - two gamma rays of 1.37 and 2.75 MeV respectively.
25. We have deliberately ignored captures by carbon, oxygen and hydrogen, whose cross sections are smaller than those of sodium, aluminum and silicon by ratios of the order of 1,000.
26. This may lend itself to discussion: In fact, the neutrons that reach the ground have been only slightly slowed as yet. However, as has already been mentioned:
- the water present in the ground (either in free form--humidity ratio--or in the form of crystallization water) exerts a rapid slowing action;
  - it is known, moreover, that the cross section varies in inverse proportion to the neutron energy. Where the neutrons still have considerable energy (upper layers of the soil), the cross sections of all the elements are diminished roughly in the same proportion, which does not modify very substantially the relative activation of the substances with respect to one another.
27. For example, some feldspars are double silicates of aluminum and of sodium, etc.
28. For example, in the case of a 25-km/hr wind, the fallout from a 5-kt fission warhead exploded at ground level covers an ellipse 35 km along its major axis and 4 km along its minor axis. In the case of a 0.5-kt one, the corresponding values are, respectively, 9 and 1.2 km.
29. Actually, the authors of the plan appear to have in mind only 1-kt fusion warheads.
30. We recall that, under the foregoing concept--dilute carbonate over the terrain and aerial explosion--it is the water contained in the soil that serves as moderator and slows the 14-MeV neutrons to so-called thermal speed.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

POSSIBLE PS-RPR COLLABORATION IN 1981 ELECTION

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 8 Dec 80 pp 24-25

[Article by Claude Jacquemart: "The Voices of Public Safety"]

[Text] "Secret meetings, complicities, petty intrigues, unprincipled coalitions, defections for small electoral ambitions": Expressions used on 27 November by Rene Andrieu, editor in chief of "L'HUMANITE" to qualify the RPR's [Rally for the Republic] play and the Socialist Party between the two rounds of legislative elections. A return of the theme in the same daily on 2 December, on the light of the results: In the Ain, "the RPR elected the socialist candidate"; in the Doubs, "the socialist elected the RPR candidate."

Is the political scenery changing? Trivial certainty. "The presidential majority ceased to exist at the same time as the union of the Left", said Marie-France Garaud. Michel Debre echoes the repeated challenge in his November "Letter" on "Public Safety": "Obsolete separatisms and traditional isolation to reunite men who together, during the needed time, intend to realize the economic, social and political effort in store for France."

Echoing also, the identical questions were published, side by side, on the same page of "Le MONDE" of 3 December: Christian Poncelet's questions, ex-Minister and Vosges RPR senator; and Georges Sarre's questions, Paris councilman and socialist deputy to the European Assembly, saying: "Is this evidence of utopia, imagining, in cold blood that socialists, gaullists and communists could together force the doors?" Remarks that he had already confided, in substance to "VALEURS ACTUELLES" on 19 May last.

Here we are, more than a year later since it has become a question of "convergences" between socialists and gaullists. One of the first to publicly recall them was RPR's general secretary, Bernard Pons who, on November 1979 said: "An agreement between the RPR and the socialists would be much less unnatural than an agreement between socialists and the UDF [French Democratic Union].

Gestures followed. There was the handshake between Jacques Chirac and Francois Mitterrand at the Paris Town Hall on 21 November 1979, an "event" which Poncelet and Sarre were not unfamiliar with, Sarre maintains the best of rapports with the gaullists at the Strasbourg Assembly. (A supporter of the meeting, Poncelet, meanwhile, regrets the "very showy" handshake). Afterwards, at the beginning of

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last Summer, there was the dinner reuniting Chirac and Mitterrand at the home of Jean de Lipkowski, RPR's counselor to foreign affairs. From that moment on, the basis for an electoral agreement would have been thrown, which today, the communists blame on their old partners of the union of the Left.

Officially, each maintains his positions. Lionel Jospin, chief counselor to Mitterrand, whom he could replace at midterm as first secretary to the party said Wednesday, to France-Inter:

"The RPR is a conservative party which belongs to the present majority. It cannot be confused in any way with a party of social reform as the socialist party."

Besides, many socialists continue to make eyes at the communists that the gaullists discard from their plans.

Therefore, there was no public agreement at the summit as the one signed by the parties of the Left in 1972. That has not stopped underhanded approaches and detailed agreements. And that has not stopped them from voting together: At Strasbourg, where the socialists and gaullists had, many times, acted in concert; at the Paris council; or during the by-elections. A sign that the voters are getting progressively used to reshuffling.

Here and there, gaullists and socialists learn to work side by side. An example: The Vosges. In 1978 the downfall of the Boussac group places this department in a dramatic situation. Poncelet, now senator for one year, exhorts the general council which he presides: "Rather than look for who set [the barn] on fire, let us work on the means of putting it out, together!"

A committee is formed by the combined parties, calling the attention of the government, in a document, about the "great destitution of the Vosges"; a meeting with Andre Chadeau, director of the Delegation for Territorial Development and Regional Action (DATAR); publication, in August of 1978 of a "Vosges Plan": 580 million francs for infra-structures.

When men unite, they succeed in finding a solution for their problems, told me Poncelet, who today feels closer to Christian Pierret, young socialist deputy from his department, than to Lionel Stoleru, giscardien secretary of state and Provencheres general counselor.

A "France Plan" for the realization of which gaullists and socialists would be associated? Now Poncelet as Debre, dreams about "public safety." He observes to me:

"Each time France finds itself in difficulties, gaullists and socialists are seen together: after the war, as well as in 1958. Socialist Guy Mollet has drafted the foundations for the Fifth Republic at the same time as gaullist Michel Debre. It is not a question of suppressing differences, but of researching the answer to economic problems together. Socialists are in agreement with us about national independence, defense policies, the need to make productive investments."

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Poncelet now holds this speech a "little everywhere", specially for the socialists'. Among his interlocutors there are Jacques Delors, Marcel Debarge, the Seine-Saint-Denis socialist senator, whom he has known close to thirty years and Sarre. (Curiously, Poncelet, Debarge and Sarre began their careers at PTT [Post-Telegraph-Telephone]).

Speaking to LIBERATION" on Wednesday Debarge minimizes the scope of this reconciliation, he said: "This famous, so much talked about contact took place at the Senate's coffee-shop. It lasted 25 minutes. During 7 minutes, Poncelet talked to me about his political reasoning. The remainder of the time we exchanged news about our respective families."

But, after last September's senatorial elections, where the communists deliberately fought PS candidates, socialist senators said to their RPR Vosges colleague: "You are right."

Could socialist and gaullist voters behave at the presidential election as in 30 November in Ain and Doubs? Good question. Gaston Defferre, Marseille's socialist deputy Mayor posed it at Bitche (Moselle), on 7 October: "There is a good chance that there will be more RPR abstentions on Giscard d'Estaing's side than on the communists side for the socialist candidate. Between the RPR and Giscard followers it is not only lack of unity but hatred as well".

All particulars about the coming election are not known. Far from it. (What will Chirac do?) But, Mitterrand can, from this moment on, measure his chances. Communist voters? He has always thought that, with the exception of some hundreds of thousands of militants, the unitary reflex would carry him through. The election of 30 November corroborates him in this feeling. ("The Communist Party administration has given a cease and desist order because it had to", said Jospin on Wednesday.) Gaullist voters? Their majority reflexes are deadened.

Certainly, first it will be necessary to clear the hurdle of the first round of voting. But that also holds true for Giscard d'Estaing who, if he runs, could find himself curtailed by the second round of voting: "With less than 30 percent he will lose his aura and he should negotiate", say his rivals.

Let us suppose that on the second round the 1974 situation is repeated: Giscard d'Estaing against Mitterrand. The conjecture is such that it is said at the PS that all possibilities are speculated a priori. What will gaullists do then? Some could abstain and others, "convergences" helping, could vote for the socialist candidate who, elected, could also be amenable to negotiations. May this happen for the sake of "public welfare".

While his lieutenants are generally prudent, Mitterrand does not hesitate to consider this perspective. On 28 November, two days before the second round of by-elections, he declared: "If I'm elected I would, of course, establish a coalition of forces with the majority. I would immediately dissolve the Chamber. If the French support my point of view, they will elect a majority of the Left. But they could also not follow me. Now, myself, I don't confuse executive and presidency. The government program should be the government's. If the French elect a conservative majority, I will nominate a conservative government."

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That was said in front of a limited circle: The Syndicate of the private press, which usually promises its hosts not to publish their remarks. Mitterrand had released it from this promise. He did not ignore that his words could feed ten chronicles by Andrieu, not to mention the incessant campaign conducted by the communist party against him: that of the PS "coming to the aid of the Right." No doubt he had thought that the message and the "signal" it contained was well worth the risk.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIONS OF TERRORISM ANALYZED

Milan IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 22 Jan 81 p 6

[Round-table discussion by reporters Maurizio Chierici, Renzo Cianfanelli, Antonio Ferrari, Renato Ferraro, Massimo Nava, Piero Ostellino, Giancarlo Pertegato, Pietro Sormani, and Mino Vignolo, all CORRIERE DELLA SERA staffers, with stenographic assistance from Giorgio Capezzuoli, Fabrizio Gecchelin, and Sergio Tavola: "The International Highways of Terrorism."]

[Text] Along the labyrinths of subversion in search of an answer: are outside forces supporting the Red Brigades and other Italian terrorist groups?

The organizations of fear, claiming the most disparate imaginable ideological, political, or nationalist motivation, are stamping their brand on assault and murder all over the world: Nobody knows for certain if they have central control headquarters, or even exactly what they want. Governments are silent or, like ours, reply to questions only in vague allusions. Maurizio Chierici, Renzo Cianfanelli, Antonio Ferrari, Renato Ferraro, Massimo Nava, Piero Ostellino, Giancarlo Pertegato, Pietro Sormani, and Mino Vignolo, the CORRIERE staff reporters who have worked most intensively on this issue, compare for our readers their experiences and the testimony they have elicited from witnesses in a number of countries.

For at least 7 years a great many Italian leaders, politicians, party leaders and government ministers have been hinting at possible international terrorist connections, and at possible meddling by foreign governments or secret agents in Italy. Andreotti, in 1974, told a MONDO reporter that there was probably a central terrorist clearing-house somewhere in Paris. President Sandro Pertini has said on at least ten different occasions that there were forces set on weakening our country, attempting to undercut Italy's political function in the Mediterranean -- the bridge between Europe and the Middle East. Other political figures, at various times dating back to the D'Urso case, have made references to "foreign interference."

Craxi, for instance, has referred to "palazzi" [buildings] here in Italy, meaning foreign embassies. Defense Minister Lelio Lagorio has warned

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us that peril might threaten "from any point of the compass." There has been mention of Czechoslovakia, Libya, Lebanon, Israel, Albania, South Yemen, the USSR, East Germany, and the United States: quite a mixed bag of major and minor powers. Brian Jenkins, of the Rand Corporation, said in an interview with CORRIERE DELLA SERA that, at least potentially, there might be four countries with an interest in destabilizing Italy. He named no names, however. Are these mere suspicions, or does somebody really know something?

- On this issue, then, IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA put together a round table for several of its staff reporters who, in the course of their assignments, have had ample occasion to gather testimony and information: Maurizio Chierici, Renzo Cianfanelli, Antonio Ferrari, Renato Ferraro, Massimo Nava, Piero Ostellino, Giancarlo Pertegato, Pietro Sormani, and Mino Vignolo. Their discussion yielded more questions than answers, but but these were both the limits and the purposes of the discussion.

OSTELLINO: I'll begin by raising a question of procedure. Our politicians, as a class, have fallen into the annoying habit of hinting at international terrorist connections without ever adducing a shred of evidence. The most flagrant such instance, I think, is that of Defense Minister Lelio Lagorio who, in an interview with our paper, said that we should be looking for such connections at every point of the compass. That intentionally broad assertion wound up telling us nothing by telling us too much. If our politicians really do know something, let them say so straight out, and produce evidence to back their assertions. If, on the other hand, they don't know anything, or if they do indeed know something but cannot talk about it for reasons of Realpolitik, then they would do better simply to shut up. I get the feeling that even in talking about terrorism, it is increasingly common for them to punctuate what they say with nudges and winks. This is a shabby way to play politics, and it becomes downright dirty when human lives and the national security are at stake.

It is fairly normal for things to happen without anyone's saying anything about them, particularly where the intelligence services are involved. There is one condition, though: that things are done right in the first place, and then when costs and benefits are added up, the answer comes out in the black. It is the responsibility of governments to set forth the objectives they wish to achieve in such a way that the achievement of some objectives is not obtained at the expense of others. If a government cannot do that, it is not capable of governing.

FERRARI: I'll give you a few episodes we might talk over.

1. Libyan refugees, interviewed by our colleague Mino Vignolo, have told us that in their country there are training camps for terrorists of every stripe -- red as well as black. Then there are at least three recent matters of particular interest: a. the mystery of the Fiumicino missiles; b. the Palestinian missiles found in the possession of alleged terrorist Daniele Pifano; c. the exchange of weapons between Italian and Palestinian terrorists. In this connection, Peci told us

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that Mario Moretti had gone to pick up fresh supplies of Palestinian weapons in Lebanon for distribution to Italian subversive groups.

2. Eastern Europe. Czechoslovakia, for one. We know about Feltrinelli's trips to Viel and Prague. We know that suspicion points to the existence of at least one training camp at Karlovy Vary. Craxi repeatedly referred to weekends spent in Czechoslovakia by several alleged terrorists.

3. An American writer, Claire Sterling, formerly a WASHINGTON POST correspondent, wrote a book based on a theory dear to the heart of ex-President Richard Nixon, to wit: that there is a subversion club, run by Moscow, whose members include such countries as Libya, South Yemen, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and the PLO.

4. Peci also told us that the Israeli intelligence services tried to make contact with the Red Brigades (BR) during the Moro kidnaping. We cannot but wonder how the Israelis managed to get the BR's address.

5. While the Moro case was at its height, a witness recounted seeing a "128" leaving the gate of the Iraqi embassy in Rome, and of recognizing Corrado Alunni as the driver. Alunni has since been acquitted of involvement in the Moro case. These are just a few of the many mysteries that make our picture of the situation so very disturbing. Of them all, the most serious -- in my view -- seems to be the mystery of Libya.

VIGNOLO: That's right. Libya is the first name to come up when you start talking terrorism. One is forced to accept one general premise: Colonel Qadhdhafi, who considers himself a great leader whose sole misfortune is to rule a nation with too few citizens, has consistently pursued a "very active" foreign policy, funded by the billions he rakes in from crude oil sales. Were the Libyans to confine themselves to reveling in their petrodollars, Qadhdhafi would rank with any other petty sheikh. The last thing Qadhdhafi wants, though, is to be just another sheikh. He has an ideology of his own, confused though it may be, compounded of nostalgia for faded Arab glory, of hopes for Arab revenge, and of strict religious observance based on the Koran. The ruler of Tripoli, however, certainly does not confine his attention to the Arab world: he preaches revolution to all the world's oppressed peoples. What he says might be the ravings of a disordered mind, but when a madman controls thousands of billions of lire, the picture changes: and all those billions are available on request to the most disparate causes. Financial assistance is by no means all, either. According to their own testimony, young Tunisians, Egyptians, Senegalese, Nigerians, and others have undergone military training in Libyan camps. We know the names of those camps, and the Tripoli government has never bothered to deny their existence. Thus far, we are dealing with known facts, but the moment we shift our sights to Italy, all certainty evaporates.

FERRARI: But do you really think Qadhdhafi is helping Italian terrorists?

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VIGNOLO: Only our intelligence people, or maybe the Soviet KGB or the American CIA, could answer that question: Last summer several leaders of the Libyan opposition in exile in Europe told me that both black and red Italian terrorists were to be found in Libyan training camps, and that Qadhdhafi is financing efforts to destabilize our country. It must be admitted that these charges come from sources that can headily be considered impartial. As of now, there is no hard evidence. Not one captured Italian terrorist has ever said flatly, "I got my training in Libya," and no repentant terrorist has ever admitted to any knowledge of training camps. This, of course, does not mean that Qadhdhafi might not be helping our terrorists, sending them weapons and money through any of several channels, including Palestinian ones.

CHIERICI: We have to do some talking about the Palestinians. We have fallen into the way of using that word as almost a synonym for conspiracy and intrigue. It seems only fair to point out that the group of Palestinians committed to terrorism is not the majority but merely a splinter group headed by George Habbash, which holds only 11 of the 299 seats in the Palestinian "parliament," fewer, proportionally, than the neo-fascist MSI holds in Italy. Habbash, moreover, is not a member of the PLO -- the PLO executive, I mean. A far more mysterious disciple of his, though, one Nayef Hawatmeth, a Jordanian of Bedouin background who holds a degree in philosophy, is a member. Hawatmeth is an intellectual whom I have seen at the center of an admiring circle of French "nouvelle vague" film-makers (Alain Resnais wanted to do a picture on his life) and left-wing Jewish journalists like Paul Jacobs of the WASHINGTON POST.

I met a lot of Italian kids in the country-house headquarters of his People's Democratic Front in the Maarad quarter of Beirut. There was a Milanese girl there who acted as interpreter for British and French people passing through. Who was she? "Just call me Maria," was all the answer I could elicit from her. It was impossible to photograph her. Although Hawatmeth shares Habbash's views on methods, he is willing to be part of the PLO: of 27 seats, he has a right to precisely one. His clashes with Arafat have been noisy, but the fact that he provides a buffer between the Palestinians who shoot and those who negotiate (Al-Fatah) generates enormous confusion among the European news media: to us, they are all terrorists. Habbash and Hawatmeth share political control over several refugee camps, where those who share their views tend to concentrate. Outside Saida, in a Hawatmeth camp, I met three Italian boys who were there ostensibly as medics... They were armed, though, and their talk was of matters other than the sick. There were also a lot of Germans. In the Habbash camp close to Beirut airport, I was astounded to come across an ambulance plainly marked "Gift of the City of Milan to the Vietnamese Refugees." Just above the legend was the device of the City of Milan. What calamitously wrong turning could have brought it here among the tents of children training to be murderers? These are the camps where the terrorists of Europe are tained; and these are the groups who handle the logistics of arms supplies to the slayers in our midst. Even so, to lump "the Palestinians" together with these marginal groups would be tantamount to accusing 57 million Italians of the Bologna massacre.

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CIANFANELLI: The existence of international ties of considerable dimensions among the various terrorist groups is, according to British authorities and analysts, a proven fact. They know in London, for one thing, that as early as 1979, elements of the armed Baader-Meinhof gang were getting training in Al-Fatah camps in Baalbek, Lebanon, and in Syria; and that in later years elements of the German Red Army Fraction trained in South Yemen took part in at least six Palestinian Front (PFLP) operations, including the Entebbe skyjacking and the earlier attack on the OPEC ministers' meeting in Vienna.

As for Italy, when Egyptian journalist Yussuf Sibai was murdered on Cyprus, according to information received in London there were found to be ties between the Red Brigades and the Iraqi-Palestinian terrorist group headed by Abu Nidal. Other collaborative arrangements are said to exist or to have existed between Iranian terrorist groups and elements of the BR, the Baader-Meinhof gang, and the PLP "who had got their training in the Soviet Union." In this instance, the news came from American sources, and was reported to Congress in Washington by Rep. Robert Sikes, then printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD some 2 years ago.

Qadhdhafi Suspect in All Quarters

Furthermore, according to British sources, these patterns of terrorist collaboration had been set up at a sort of multinational terrorist meeting several years ago, held in a rented parish hall in Florence, under the auspices of members of the since-dissolved outfit known as Worker Power (PO). Among those reportedly in attendance were members of the IRA, the German RAF, including Italians, Spaniards, and Palestinians; this was the meeting at which they worked out what has since become known as "distribution of labor" in international terrorism.

SORMANI: Another case here in Italy that is little known, or at least generally overlooked, is that of Turkey. And yet there are and were, even before the September coup d'etat, several parallels between the situation in our countries and that in Turkey, whether you look at them from the political or the terrorist angle. Terrorism -- call it political violence if you will -- in Turkey brought death to 3,000 people in 1979 alone, and has since levelled off at a death toll of 30 per day.

Even there you hear talk of international terrorist links, though there is not much hard evidence to back it up. Apparently the authorities have discovered that there was a brisk trade in weapons coming from the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries, filtering through Bulgaria. A large arsenal was found on the Syrian border. It is said, furthermore, that several terrorists known to belong to the extreme right, represented by some forty or more groups, took training courses in Lebanon. Here again there is talk of ties between the Red Brigades and the German Red Army Fraction.

One thing certain is that there is a radio transmitter in East Germany run by the pro-Soviet Turkish Communist Party, which was broadcasting propaganda calling for armed rebellion both before and after the coup d'etat.

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PERTEGATO: The track of foreign interference has left its marks on the terrorist investigations. It has been ascertained that secret agent Donald Stark, believed to be a CIA man, was involved in events surrounding the "Revolutionary Action" affair. Once again, ties emerged in the pretrial investigation of the Bologna union members involved in the assaults at Abano Terme and the splinter group known as the Maquis shedding light on the baffling presence of several South American personages who were hastily released after brief incarceration, and who forthwith disappeared. So we go from the public statements of Italian politicians who allude, but will not say flat-out; who let it be understood that maybe they might just know something, but will not say how they came by such knowledge -- to inquiries that are suddenly broken off in midair, allowing people who quite probably would be able to answer some of the questions that bother us and the public to vanish into the murk. I think there is little doubt as to the existence of outside meddling: the problem is to establish its effectiveness.

[Question] Could you cite us an example or two?

PERTEGATO: I am convinced that the Pifano case could help us to get an idea of the scope of foreign meddling in the area of subversion. If Pifano's "autonomous collective" did indeed escalate from extremism to terrorism, as the police say they did, there can be no doubt whatsoever that the process whereby that transition came about is part and parcel of the way things are in Italy. The "collective's" political and ideological baggage are an outgrowth of a part of our recent political history. This group, quite apart from individual responsibility or guilt, thus shares a common readiness to engage in subversion with other "autonomous" groups. The fact that it maintains ties with a Palestinian faction enables this group and the others which may have ties to it to obtain some very powerful and dangerous weapons, such as ground-to-air missiles. This means that the group can or could also count on centers for training, for sanctuary, or for support, which could greatly enhance its potential for terror and its ability to hold out against the repressive operations of Italian government agencies.

What is the next threat? Precisely what seems to be happening in Italy right now: the terrorists, having a military crisis of their own to deal with, are successfully reaching out to grab political turf of their own. Their potential for doing harm increases with every increment of credibility they gain, and may well become a tool for foreign interference. Mussolini's activism on the eve of World War I was intimately linked with the financial backing he got from France, for one. What could this mean? That what holds true for a political group can hold equally true for a terrorist organization if, in addition to playing a criminal role, it also assumes the guise of a political force. Right here you have the very apogee of danger.

The repeated rescues of Colonel Qadhdhafi by Italian intelligence people are an alarming example, because it is clear that foreign interference is the more readily feasible the more the Italian state is weakened or compromised from within, particularly in its most delicate security apparatus.

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FERRARI: In an interview he gave me 3 or 4 years ago, General Vito Miceli, ex-chief of Italian intelligence, said that the Italian government had become a hero to the Arab world, and to Libya in particular.

VIGNOLO: That's true. On at least two occasions Italian intelligence has thwarted plots to assassinate Qadhafi. We know some of the details of one such plot. It was the so-called Hilton plan, first hatched at the end of 1971, and continued into the early months of 1972. It was backed financially by a certain Umar Al Shalhi, who was one of King Idriss' top advisers, who was living in exile in Geneva at the time. He had recruited French mercenaries under the command of a former officer in the British army. The ship that was to put the mercenaries ashore in Libya was all ready to sail from the port of Trieste, but the Italian intelligence services, having got wind of what was afoot, prevented its departure.

Who Is Helping the Italian Groups?

Relations between Italy and Libya have always been complicated and contradictory. Sometimes they look about as bad as could be -- Qadhafi blusters, impounds a few Italian fishing trawlers, arrests Italian nationals without any grounds whatsoever, and demands billions of dollars in war reparations. The Italians in turn threaten reprisals -- and in the end, like the good Mediterraneans we are, we go back to dwelling together in love and harmony, thanks to Libyan oil and Italian technology. A scant year after the coup d'etat Qadhafi expelled 23,000 of our fellow-citizens from Libya without indemnity of any kind. Today, though, the Italian colony in Libya numbers a thriving 17,000 or so, and is still growing. Italy is Libya's number-one trading partner, and the size of our two-way trade is considerable: in the first 10 months of 1980 it amounted to more than 4,000 billion lire for the visible portion alone. Then there are the arms supplies which, for us Italians, are a very big deal indeed. Libyan oil covers 15 percent of our requirements. Qadhafi criticizes Italy, and may well be helping to destabilize it, but he is sensitive to its charm. He is very proud to be a FIAT shareholder, and his burning ambition today is to pay a state visit to Rome. Both the government and the parties are deeply divided as to the advisability of inviting him. But everything may still work out: Libya's 1980-1985 5-year plan calls for expenditures of 80,000 billion lire. Business is business, after all.

SORMANI: There are obviously pressures at work, and it is difficult, under the circumstances, to avoid them. We must change the conditions that gave rise to them in the first place. Consider, for example, that prior to the Iranian crisis, we were getting 80 percent of our oil from three countries: Iran, Iraq, and Libya. Greater diversification of our sources of supply would reduce the danger of our being exposed to economic or political blackmail, and perhaps even to terrorism.

CHIERICI: Let's face it: there would be no more wars and no terrorism if there were no weapons. Italy is a major arms supplier. Oto Melara,

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a state-owned company, gets around any unpleasantness by shipping the tanks it is forbidden to sell South Africa on a roundabout route via -- say -- Israel. During the battle of Beirut, Maronite Christians and Palestinians were shooting each other with rifles from Brescia. JEUNE AFRIQUE carried a cartoon showing the two sides firing spaghetti and tomatoes at each other from identical rifles. The biggest arms dealer in the world is a man named Sam Cummings, who owns Intermarco. He can outfit 40 divisions in 24 hours: it will take him 48 hours more if the client wants a particular color for the uniforms. Along with Kasogi, a Saud and boon companion to the sovereign, and the Czechoslovak purveyors, he dominates the world market. Does he dominate it by simply obeying the ground-rules of trading for profit? When it comes to wars and revolutions, nobody believes that for a minute. Cummings readily admits to being a retired CIA man. "I left the Agency in 1956," he told me in his Alexandria (Virginia) office, only 2 kilometers from the Pentagon.

NAVA: I shall try to give you a homier picture of terrorism, just to keep us from wondering about the existence of international terrorist centers or direct intervention by other nations, as if there were an organized worldwide plot under way to undermine Italy, and as if our country were just sitting there with folded hands, looking at the plot.

If we analyze the history of Italian terrorist groups, the personal backgrounds of every individual terrorist, and the makeup of certain groups. we can see that the Red Brigades and Prima Linea certainly have contacts and connection with foreign groups, but that they act according to a pattern, an ideology, and objectives that are their own homegrown products. Contacts there are: one need only remember the meetings among several Prima Linea leaders and the French terrorist groups in Provence, or Moretti's trips to Lebanon to get weapons (which we learned of from Peci). Or again, the episode that came out just recently in the Turin BR investigation in connection with attorney Sergio Spazzali who actually got Polaroid pictures of the Schleyer kidnaping by mail from the Red Army Fraction in Germany.

In the course of that same inquiry there was mention of a meeting of IRA, ETA, and BR people to be held in Paris: topic for discussion -- simultaneous strikes on targets all over Europe.

Should this military action be set in train, a legal press conference would have to be set up in Paris for propaganda purposes. That means that the contacts are there, but to find out whether there is one hand holding the string you might work backwards. Rather than starting at the summit and working down to see what power would find this game to its liking, you would have to take another look at the contacts that have come to light of recent years between Italian and foreign terrorist organizations.

I would like to insert a parenthetical observation here about relations with the Middle East: immediately following the flap about the missiles in Pifano's possession, the suggestion was made -- and never withdrawn -- that Italian intelligence people had issued a kind of unwritten safe-conduct pass to the Palestinian terrorist organizations in exchange for



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neutrality and peace in Italy in the wake of the Fiumicino attack.

PERTEGATO: There may be a tacit understanding between the terrorists and the Italian state. This kind of a contract, though, if it was actually entered into, could work only between one very weak party and a very strong one: if the Italian government did indeed decide to make a deal, be it in exchange for oil or in exchange for security, with the terrorists -- Palestinian or otherwise -- this would mean going back to the notion of a weak party, which in this case would be the Italian government.

NAVA: As I see it, we must not forget that terrorism is still not an end in itself, but a means to an end. Hence, in addition to analysis and the quest for the truth about international centers, we have to consider the national background and logic of each outbreak of terrorism. And along with this, we must consider the use of terrorism as a tool, one to be used primarily by domestic, national centers.

PERTEGATO: At a recent European conference on terrorism, there was an extremely violent verbal attack by the Spanish delegates, who protested emphatically against the tolerant stand France takes vis-a-vis the ETA terrorists. And that brings us back to the question of terrorism as a political entity, and of what lies above, around, and inside terrorism.

FERRARI: I should like to point out here that last summer [Italian] President Pertini, clearly referring to Giscard d'Estaing and hence to France, spoke harshly of foreign governments which have not yet realized, or refuse to realize, the gravity of the terrorist attacks now concentrated on Italy, and hence on the Mediterranean basin.

FERRARO: The few facts we have are not enough to establish whether we are dealing here with sporadic cooperation between guerrilla movements -- among "colleagues" in subversion -- or a political plot of vast and far-flung dimensions. The point. A number of foreign intelligence services have been accused. The hunt for the "cui prodest" is still causing a good deal of perplexity in the terrorist field, but, absent specific information it cannot be abandoned, if we assume that back of apparently irrational violence there ~~are~~ indeed rational designs. This quest obviously cannot give us certainty: at best it can point out some trails to follow. Israel's interest in hitting at Europe, of which Italy is the soft underbelly, following the European shift to a pro-Arab stance in the wake of the Yom Kippur war, is to see that the blame falls on the Arabs, and so Israel may have a motive there. Consider the murder of Aldo Moro, the man who, more than anyone else in Italy, had contributed to the foreign policy turnaround. As for Czechoslovakia, Albania, Iraq, South Yemen, and the Palestinian extremist groups close to these positions, the trails lead to the KGB. International subversive activities on the part of these governments must have been given at least tacit approval by the Soviet authorities. As for Libya, then, the Americans cannot be wholly in the dark as to what is happening there, and that observation applies to the other nations too, considering the efficiency of modern means of espionage.

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SORMANI: In this connection I should like to point out that we are talking about the KGB, the CIA, and the intelligence services of other countries as if they could be identified with their governments. That is not necessarily so. In some cases, the intelligence agencies act independently of their governments, while in others we see what amounts to a division of labor. It is difficult to be sure in every instance which hypothesis is the right one, but we must always consider both.

FERRARO: The charges against the great powers have yet to be proved. What is certain, though, is that the major potential hotbeds of international terrorism are to be found in the Third World. The violence the Palestinians employ to win the right to a homeland, like the taking of American hostages in Iran, are merely examples of a rising tide which, if global relationships do not change, will sweep everything before it.

Anyone who travels in the Third World knows what a pent-up charge of violence lies in the endless "bidonvilles" [shanty-towns] and in the open country where people are dying of hunger. In a word: the developed countries, East and West, are still living in relative tranquility, but they are living on a volcano that is starting to stir.

CHIERICI: There are some strange games going on between the super-powers' intelligence services. I don't intend to get carried away by spy-thriller scenarios. I remember one episode that has gone down in history. Habbash put together the most formidable terrorist organization, at least several years ago. Well, on 11 August 1973 an MEA Caravelle flight (Lebanese Airlines) en route from Vienna to Bagdad, was intercepted by nine Israeli fighter planes. They forced it to land on a military airstrip near Tel Aviv. They made the passengers get out, and the Israeli chief of the general staff, David Elazar, personally scrutinized each passenger. He was certain that Habbash was among them. He was not. Why not? A few days later the story broke in all the papers. Getting wind of what the Israelis planned to do, American intelligence got in touch with the Soviets, who managed to get Habbash off the plane at the very last moment. That leaves us with a puzzling question: why in the world did the Americans want to rescue a terrorist like that Palestinian extremist? The same goes for Qadhdhafi. All of Libya's helicopters could be parked on a football field. Is it possible that, having seriously decided to get rid of that nuisance of a Qadhdhafi, the invaders of Afghanistan, and the strategists who make and unmake governments in Latin America, simply can't shake him off? Perhaps both Habbash and Qadhdhafi represent a grey, ambiguous area which is convenient for all concerned.

VIGNOLO: I am absolutely certain that if Qadhdhafi were really very unwelcome to either the Americans or the Soviets, he wouldn't last 24 hours.

FERRARI: Let's get back to talking about Italian terrorism. You might picture it as a pair of slippers, which can be filled by "feet" of any type or color. Today we can spin a thousand scenarios. I am particularly fond of two practical examples, two events that occurred in the

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past few years. The first has to do with Ronald Stark, to whom Per-tegato referred a while back, and the second has to do with the Hyperion school in Paris.

The Stark case. Stark is an odd fish who does business in Belgium, who lives a luxurious life, and who is connected with heroin processing. He came to Italy in 1975: apparently his assignment was to recruit people from the leftist subversive fringe. Stark was arrested on a narcotics charge and sentenced to prison, where he met a lot of subversive movement leaders. Nobody is sure whether he was trying to get a "make" on leftist subversive leaders -- although this partly contradicts what I said at the start -- in order to turn them over to the police, or whether he was there to feed the fires of subversion in the prison. One story about Stark is this one: a prisoner was found -- just after his release from Bologna prison -- with a little map in his pocket showing the layout of a Lebanese camp, complete with directions for getting directly to the camp leader, including lots of telephone numbers, references, and guarantees. Stark kept on with his dubious work. After 7 April, an important date in the history of Italian anti-terrorism, Stark was released from prison because he was very seriously ill. He was sent to Florence, where he received visits from officials -- apparently Americans -- after which he disappeared and nobody has heard of him since.

The Hyperion case. The date it all began is, once again, 7 April. Word got about that there was this luxurious school in France, whose facade concealed maneuvers involving some very strange individuals. Within its walls were to be found, above all, three persons who once were well known in Italy. Providentially there just happened to be an interview -- exclusive -- with an intelligence type who told the story of the Hyperion school. And so the French trail (Andreotti referred to Paris as the hub of international subversion) went stone cold.

NAVA: More about Hyperion. Immediately after the Moro kidnaping, when mention was made of the so-called "grand old man" in a PAESE SERA article, there was a report on the doings of a certain Corrado Simioni, an ex-socialist and a friend of Curcio, who was pointed to as a possible "grand old man"; it is certain that Simioni was a frequent visitor at the French school. The article said -- and it has never been retracted -- that Simioni was attending the Hyperion school on a scholarship from USIS.

PERTEGATO: In troubled times for terrorism, as in troubled times for institutions, the danger of increasingly massive interference is heightened, particularly if there is a perceived likelihood of authoritarian shifts or coups in democratic regimes.

What Is Happening in Turkey?

SORMANI: The danger of an authoritarian solution has surfaced in Turkey, where a military regime has taken over. The unstable political situation, which had led to total paralysis in parliament, triggered

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an escalation of terrorism, which in turn heightened the instability. This moved the military to step in, as they had before in 1969 and again in 1971. The upshot is that terrorism has now all but vanished, but so has freedom. The military have intentions of returning power to civilian hands, but the problem is to find out whether civilians can govern without plunging the country into violence once again.

CIANFANELLI: I asked Walter Laqueur, one of the top experts on terrorism and the author of several books on the subject, if he believes we have a similar threat here in Italy. Here is his somewhat paradoxical reply: "I think that, politically, the Red Brigades have had it. I would give them another 12 or 18 months, but not much more. Why? because in the end the strategists of the revolution will be persuaded that you can kill this one or that one in Italy, but nothing ever happens. And there is a certain dialectic in this. If the Italian state were stronger, the BR might do better. But there is no real target in Italy.. Whom can they attack? In Russia, there was the czar, but in Italy? In other words, the weakness of the Italian state and that of other countries shows that there are connections, but that they are not very important. The theory of the great international conspiracy to destabilize a little country makes no sense."

VIGNOLO: Italy, like Turkey, is a Mediterranean country, which lies in a frontier region between the two blocs and is therefore particularly subject to various kinds of pressure. Furthermore, the lack of raw materials makes it vulnerable, even from the energy angle. Thus far, at least, it would appear that the policy is to avoid making any move that might in any way offend any oil producer.

NAVA: Immediately following the assaults and the discovery of international links among terrorist groups, particularly inside European countries, there was talk of agreements among the various governments to thwart this "common enemy." Nothing ever came of all those proposals. I wonder, myself, whether there is not some slight temptation to let things be, upon reflection that, for domestic use, terrorism might serve the ends of one country or another. Each country, in short, "amanages" it, stamps it out, or gives it a new green light, according to its particular situation of the moment.

SORMANI: There are some things that fall into the purview of national governments, and there are others that are the responsibility of the international community. If, as it would seem, there are indeed connections among the various terrorist organizations, and between them and some governments, the problem must be approached directly and at the community level, in the various international fora: the Communities, the European Parliament, the UN and other organizations. We might convoke a world conference on terrorism.

PERTEGATO: The European Council held a conference on terrorism, at which Professor Artel Merari, of the Tel Aviv Center for Strategic Studies, adduced some thought-provoking examples: members of a Turkish terrorist organization helped a Palestinian group to attack the

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Egyptian embassy in Ankara in 1979; members of the Corsican National Front were guests of Lebanese camps in 1978; at the end of April in that same year, representatives of the German terrorists, of the Red Brigades, of the Japanese Red Army, and of the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine met in Cuba to talk about operational cooperation. Is it really possible that these allegations, made from an official European rostrum, have met with no response save silence? And what about us, as journalists: what can we do about it?

OSTELLINO: It is not a reporter's job to ferret out and neutralize possible international links among terrorists. The press can do no more than to report what it has learned and ask the political class for more clarity. The mass media are merely a mirror of the political process, not the determining factor in it. Their mission is to keep reminding the political class that political acts invariably have political consequences -- for which the political class must shoulder the responsibility and perhaps pay the price -- and, at the same time, to convey the expectations of the rest of society to the politicians. No more.

Let's take an example: let's say that the press learns that Qadhdhafi actually is one of our home-grown terrorists' contacts and that the government or certain sectors of the political class feel that, rather than lose our oil, it would be better not to publish the news. Well, in circumstances like these, let the government or its spokesman find the courage to stand up and accept the grave responsibility of introducing legislation on the floor of parliament to limit freedom of the press, which is tantamount to lowering this country to an inferior level of freedom. They cannot claim the right to straddle the issue by merely asking the press to censor itself, which means asking reporters to pull their chestnuts out of the fire, and then hand out patriotic laurels to everybody who goes along with that. In short, let the shoe-maker stick to his last, and the press stick to reporting -- without self-censorship if possible -- and the politicians stick to running the country -- if possible without trying to infringe upon the independence and freedom of the press. What is actually happening, though, is that our political class seems to have acquired the deplorable habit of throwing stones -- at the independence and freedom of the press -- and of hiding its hand, of blaming others for what is really its fault, or worse, for its own anti-liberal yearnings.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

INVESTIGATIVE REPORT ON PCI'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS

Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 2, 4, 7, 10 Jan 81 p 3 respectively

[Article by Frane Barbieri: "Survey Trip to the Archipelago of the Communist Party"]  
[10 Jan 81, p 3]

[Text] Berlinguer without any help from Marx. The communist parties are either "struggling" or they are "in power": The PCI [Italian Communist Party] wants to be both at the same time. It has a very efficient organization which however is entirely too ideological in terms of its concepts in dealing with a working class which is no longer monolithic but which is differentiated in terms of problems and aspirations. Militants who participate in opposing demonstrations. Says one leader: "There is a storm going on in the PCI."

Turin. It seemed to me that almost the only full-time job in Italy today was being a communist. I developed that idea in the course of my survey trip to the PCI. In more than 3 weeks, nobody has ever missed any appointments and no schedules had to be shuffled around.

It seemed almost incredible to get to all of the assemblies, meetings, debates, and interviews in the cities, provinces, and regions all over the place--right on time. Both the leaders and the militants, whom I had to meet, I always found at their posts, even at night and during holidays. It seemed to me that I had become a part of a technologically perfect mechanism, an ever-present and all-knowing mechanism, which manages to produce an enormous quantity of political work in a continuous stream.

It sufficed for Gianni Giandresco, Napolitano's deputy in the organizational section, to pick up the phone and call communist party headquarters--and everything I needed for my mission would be arranged out in the regions and provinces.

At this point one might start an endless discussion among those who maintain that an organization, working at full speed, is a good omen for a malfunctioning society and those who, on the contrary, believe that the efficiency of the PCI machinery is a part of that malfunctioning, as a matter of fact accentuating it: with the guarantee of a democratic dialectic, the other political forces basically demand a transformation of the PCI in their own image and to their own measurements; the PCI in turn obstinately insists on retaining its own image as long as possible, the image

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which had given it its strength, refusing to weaken itself as an organizational machine in order to give its conversation partners more of a feeling of safety.

In spite of that I found that, although born in the imagination of all communist parties, the Italian Communist Party is suffering from completely different problems. While the problem of the Western communist parties springs from the fact that they are too small, the problem that it is too big, from certain angles, becomes a problem for the PCI.

While the other communists in the West have become mortified because they have been out of power for too long and while the Eastern communist parties in turn have been levelled off because they have become merged with the establishment, the PCI is beginning to feel the mortification of somebody who has been at the very threshold of power for entirely too long. While it is almost impossible for it to take a step forward to get in, it is just as difficult for it to take a step backward in order to remove itself further.

The communist parties are known either as fighting parties or as parties in power, both in the absolute sense. The PCI instead has worked out a middle-way formula: "A fighting party and a party in the administration." Ideologically ambiguous and politically rather precarious, this formula creates greater problems, at least in qualitative terms.

The communist systems do not find the right key for opening the way to modern development within a collectivist formula. The parties in the West are reduced to being the mechanical and preconceived denial of modern convulsed development, rather than becoming a decisive element in that development. The PCI has adopted for itself the ambitious design of overcoming both of these things. In other words, it wants to create a modern party for a modern society.

My trip to the PCI, it seemed to me, came precisely at the moment when it gets to feel the first big repercussions from its ambitious transformation. The organizational mechanism is anything but jammed. But you find that its political product will not do--not in quantitative but in qualitative terms; we did not realize in time that the political-social "market" had changed in the meantime.

Society did not develop according to the projections of the machine, entirely too mechanical, in terms of organization and entirely too ideological in its concepts. By way of continuation of technological expansion and the economic crisis, the body of society as a whole has undergone such a stratification and diversification that the monolithic party, with a vision of the "world of labor" which is likewise still monolithic, has been unable to keep up with developments in spite of its ramifications.

It seems to me that I was able to detect rather quickly that this is the real job for the PCI and that it would be a mistake to go on deciphering it by calculating the number of followers of Berlinguer, Ingrao, or Napolitano, in the sections.

This is a job which, by the way, is accepted also by the responsible leaders without trying to hide behind the usual dialectical smokescreen. The PCI official

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responsible for Turin, Giuliano Ferrara, asks himself quite bluntly: "Can a machine-party absorb and assimilate the various thrusts which take place in modern society, can it understand them and insert them into its own social proposals?"

Ferrara, who comes from the very latest draft of party leaders, immediately gave me a reply to this question: "This PCI, with its peculiar features, which still has its residual sediment from its Leninist tradition, this party which--and I say this quite openly--is something different from a cadre party, a party which somehow feels that it is the custodian, not of the need for expressing the differentiated interests of the various social groups in a direct fashion, but instead expressing, through a transformation undertaking, the interests of the working class as a "general class," this party is today caught in a storm. And it is in serious difficulty. Why? Because it very often fails to grasp the logic of differentiation, of the further and ever-growing subdivision of that which once upon a time was a single mythical universe: the working class at the center of so many different social groups."

It was not by chance that, in Turin, where I began my journey, I heard talk about "strong tendencies of no longer being satisfied with the old certainties of the worker party." As Saverio Vertone, managing editor of the magazine NUOVA SOCIETA, put it: "The proposals of EUR [labor union headquarters] and Eliseo are things of the past in the PCI much more so than in the labor unions and less in the PCI in Turin and in the Turin labor union than in the party and labor union nationwide."

It was then pointed out in Turin that "the vanguard forces did not see the situation first, better, or in longer-range terms than the main body." Vertone asks himself this: "Was it too difficult to visualize a figure of 40,000 before finding ourselves facing it, as if it had come out of nowhere?" The PCI conference on Fiat and the inquiry regarding diversification among the workers and laborers did properly state the problem and did bring out the warning signs but "although it was able to understand and tackle the problems, the PCI in Turin was not strong enough and did not have the necessary authority to resist, to the very end, the suction effect of the labor union which in turn was swept along by the blind vanguard forces."

Alberto Baldissera, one of the authors in the research project conducted at the Gramsci Institute for the PCI among the workers and laborers in the Turin factories, maintains that the survey predicted the emersion of this iceberg against which the integralist formula of the "world of labor" was bound to be shipwrecked.

A few indicative figures will suffice. Concerning motivations for work, the responses from the skilled workers, white-collar employees, and supervisory personnel differ from those given by the workers in the following manner: The "skilled workers" are motivated by the "possibility of improving my position" and by the "varied and interesting activity" to the extent of 65.7 percent (21.2 plus 44.5), while among the workers, 36.5 percent prevail with a motivation of "satisfactory and safe wages" and only 15.7 percent are attracted by "interesting activities."

In the institute's analysis, it was found in the PCI that, among the skilled workers and white-collar employees, there is a "professional" orientation toward work, whereas among the workers the orientation toward work is "instrumental." Consequently,

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among the criteria of fair wage payments, answering the question: "Who should be paid more?" the workers emphasize hard work while the other segment of the non-manual workers demand fair wages for professional status, output, and responsibility.

From this there normally also springs a different relationship in dealing with the labor unions and the unity-oriented class initiative. Lucio Libertini, of the Central Committee, attributes this to a "weak-willed egalitarianism" and, in an article, he issues the following warning: "Within a labor force, which is becoming increasingly organized and in which the middle-level technical cadres assume growing importance, this error can become tragic."

Stratification, springing from the technological revolution, has turned all of the ideological schemes upside down and has lacerated the social body in which the strength of the PCI was historically rooted. Says Ferrara: "The problem not only is the relationship with the middle-level cadres and their social identification, both as technicians and as employees, but also as section heads and shop foremen; we also have the problem of unification of the social groups that are directly made up of workers and that have never before been as diversified as during this phase."

For a party such as the PCI, looking for its proper position, claiming to be in a central spot, in a developed industrial society, it has for quite some time no longer been enough to be purely "worker-oriented." Now it is forced quite suddenly also to figure out "who are the workers today?" and it must do so, it seems, without any help from Marx.

It was enough for me to enter a first base section of the "mythical universe" of the working class to discover to what extent an answer to that critical question is not at all easy. I attended a meeting of the PCI section in the Mirafiori Fiat. The interior decor of the room, located in a basement, already reflected the difficulty to reconcile contradiction within a single political line: between Gramsci and Di Vittorio there was a portrait of the Vietnamese revolutionary with the following legend: "The ideals of the communist Ho Chi Minh have won out."

That was written on the wall opposite a sign which nobody realized should have been removed in order not to confuse the ideas regarding the topic on the agenda which was "government of national solidarity"--while the report was supposed to explain the new "turn at Salerno." In trying to reconcile the irreconcilable the reporting officer was very frank: "After watching TV, I collapsed in my chair: Emmanuele Rocco had just told me that the historical compromise was dead. Then, after reading the document and after the Berlinguer interview, I found that the historical compromise still stands, with the difference that the PCI now suggests itself as a candidate for managing the country."

The "machine," although sufficient, does not always manage to cover the intervals of bewilderment between spontaneous and emotional reactions and official directives. Thus I was able to see that confusion still prevails and that it was even further accentuated regarding the identity of the "new working class" and the stratification that took place in the world of labor.

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After the meeting, about half a score of activists got together with me around the head table to discuss the many opportunities the PCI missed out on in the big factory. Said Guzzardi, a worker and labor union delegate: "The problem of stratification does exist. It is difficult to solve it because enterprise organization makes contact difficult. We see the solution in the reconstruction of the fabric, in the sense of an integral cycle where the professional figures, from the common laborer to the planner, would be unified in a well-defined area. Today these are air-tight compartments and we cannot interconnect them."

Bona, a young worker who had immigrated from the South, commented: "The split does not come from the fact that they express their professional status. But there is a split because--in the absence of professional status--they want to maintain their position in the chain of command, which they did not earn by virtue of technical training, thus separating themselves from the rest."

Tecchiati, an old worker, said: "We have no contact with the technicians. Sometimes they come by. You cannot consider the section head a technician; he knows less about the machines than I do."

I observed that the problem perhaps springs from the failure to communicate on work but this becomes a social and political matter, expressing the shifts and splits in the world of labor itself. The very "central nature" of the working class, on which the PCI's doctrine is based, assumes another dimension: the downgrading of manual labor and the upgrading of the technician, the computer operator, can create a tendency to shift the central essence from the worker to the technician or to break it up into two opposing central positions.

The answers show how far we are from a synthesis. I noted two extreme poles. Said delegate Guzzardi: "For us, the central aspect must cover the entire work cycle and so long as this is not the case, you do not yet have any central position for the worker as such. We cannot just look forward to a party of assembly line workers."

At the other extreme I found an old-line activist who did not want his name to be released: "Those 40,000 turned out to be our Vendee. Getting together to demand the right which the others demand more nobly is not a positive thing. A specific anti-worker feeling has developed around that group in dealing with those who castigated the giant for 35 days. The whole thing broke wide open with the demonstration of the 40,000."

The judgment of Libertini on the new society is explained better in the light of the contradictions I found at the Mirafiori section: "Too often clinging to the barred gates, without analyzing what was moving deep down in a mass of workers as differentiated as all that."

The crucial problem of the PCI becomes even more intricate as we discover, from the words of a militant, that members of the same party also participated in the opposing demonstration--just a few, but they were communists just the same.

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[4 Jan 81, p 3]

[Text] Berlinguer-Craxi--competing for the middle strata. The acrimony of the PCI toward the socialists does not seem to us to be due to their alliance with the DC but to the agility and lack of prejudice with which they move among the new social stratifications. In view of the splits that took place in the world of labor, the communist strategy reveals delays and doubts. Will Turin once again precede the rest of Italy? The situation in the industrial triangle.

Turin. During the days of the "second Salerno" I heard a rather odd judgment on the PCI's new strategy: "The turnabout is abrupt in relations between the PCI and the DC but not between the PCI and the enterprise, the employers." That analysis was given to me by Fausto Bertinotti, Turin regional CGIL secretary. In other words, it would mean that the PCI, moving on from constructive confrontation to harsh clash in the political arena, at the same time is seeking to calm social tensions down. As the crisis rages on, it has less to fear in terms of political breaks at the top than social splits in the world of labor, something which is mythical as a concept but which still is the only real point of reference in the PCI's strategy.

Says Bertinotti: "The prevalence of the classical form of the class struggle, such as it emerged at Fiat, exposes us to a political risk: The clash was so frontal that the workers tend to fall apart, more or less, in the face of the big choices. On the one hand there is moderation and on the other hand there is radicalization. Stratifications are accentuated during the crisis and we run the risk of a radicalization within the PCI itself. That points to an attenuation of the conflict with the enterprise and the strata that sustain enterprise culture. Diversifications are such that they impose a reassembling of the working class."

Bertinotti asks himself this: "How can we combine the aspect of unity and the differences which have now become irreconcilable?" He sees one "extremely difficult" solution in the "reconstruction of a new 'central position' broken up into the components which are equal to the earlier and traditional ones." Otherwise, it would be necessary to resign oneself to accepting the worker "technician polarization." On that assumption, according to Vertone, managing editor of NUOVASOCIETA, the party's Turin magazine, from the "solitude of a single class" it is just "one short step toward the solitude of the PCI."

Giuliano Ferrara, the PCI official in charge of Turin, at the same time says that "the important thing for the party now is to recover lost ground" but it is also necessary "to get the party to represent everybody and everything"; he also wants to point out that the cleavages manifest themselves much more traumatically here than in other industrial centers. The traditional discrimination between the Piedmont worker and the immigrant worker has now also been joined by the division--in terms of generations likewise--caused by the hot autumn of 1969, in order now to find "a new levy, so far unknown, which, by virtue of the speaking style, the dress, and the peculiar interest, appears different almost anthropologically from the two traditional types," and on top of all that there is the multiplication of stratifications in the big factories along with "cultural and social communication breakdown"

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between the plant and the city. "In addition to having their professional status and their precise social identity downgraded, the majority of the workers in Turin had to come to grips with a crisis in their identity as citizens, with the difficulty of becoming a part of the city."

Finite Certainties

At this point we should give the floor to mayor Novelli. As a communist he found that almost all of the old certainties have fallen apart: "Right after 1948, after 1955 at Fiat, after the events in Hungary in 1956, during the time of the Khrushchev earthquake, I always thought that I had some safe anchorage; but today all I can see is continuing doubt."

But even until now it has been a "uplifting experience" to deal with the employed class and the disadvantaged class, the organized class, and the fringes which again suggest the exasperations of the South but always one had to take into account the party's two-faced attitude." But now, in addition to this two-faced worker reality we have the new middle stratum which is not parasitary but productive: "A new class of technicians, having risen from the ranks, thus creating their own specific culture."

According to Novelli, it was not by chance that the new reality of the factory and industrial society was discovered in Turin. "The PCI can only come to grips with this multifaceted reality." As a communist mayor, he can see no other alternative: "This is a traumatizing and stimulating undertaking in the search of the big melting pot of Turin." The formulas for the possible melting pot are still rather vague. One gets out of a crisis with one formula less, with the totalizing one crumbling, rather than with one formula more.

Ferrara talked to me quite frankly, with a touch of nostalgia, about the Olivetti model, expressing his bitterness over the fact that it was not accepted, just 50 kilometers away, by Ivrea at Turin. His sorrow seemed to be aimed toward the world of business and industry but concealed the fact that the Olivetti approach was dismissed rather lightly also by the PCI, as some kind of subtle interclassist sub-version.

It will have to be determined--also as far as the PCI is concerned--whether Turin, with its more definite splits, is separate from the rest of Italy or whether once again it leads. We do not have valid elements for maintaining that the Turin situation does not more clearly bring out the precursor features of the new industrial society. Shifted in terms of time, is it not perhaps the same conditions from which sprang "the new order," the Gramsci approach, and, in many ways, perhaps even the PCI itself, at least in terms of its anticonformist part, which distinguishes it from the brother parties?

At any rate, continuing my investigation in the rest of the industrial triangle and in Emilia Romagna, I quickly noted the differences. It is not that the PCI officials in those areas are not facing the phenomena of the new social stratifications. They experience them only in a less lacerating form and in different manifestations. In some cases they tackled the phenomenon somewhat earlier (such as at Milan) but in

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others they have not yet come to grips with it, they have ensconced themselves behind the old worker barricades (such as at Brescia); in still other places, they find it calmed down by virtue of the industrial structure (such as at Genoa); and then again there are places where they absorb it in the setup of a consolidated local PCI power (such as at Modena and Bologna).

It turns out that the split in the world of labor, between workers and the computer operators, is manifested differently in a big industry as compared to a medium or small industry, where intercommunications are more direct. We note a different symptomatology among big public and big private enterprises. At Genoa, for example, the PCI is managing to restore a closer relationship with the technocrats of the IRI [Industrial Reconstruction Institute], rather than with the middle-level supervisory personnel and management of a private outfit (in view of the socialist-like thrust inherent in a public enterprise). Nevertheless, the relationship is broken up almost everywhere because the new middle stratum, a product of automation and information science, demands its own central position within the framework of the world of labor, if not a position definitely separated from it.

Let us look what I was told by some of the PCI officials. Cervetti, the secretary for Lombardy, told me: "Attention has been devoted in recent years to the problems of the local administration, to the detriment of attention to be paid to the differentiations among social groups, hence, our rather remote position and the delay in our analysis. We have also been getting some trouble as a result of the 'little bit of worker orientation' among the old workers (who accept the line as a 'tactic for hitting at the enemy'); but the real problems spring from reality such as it is and among them the biggest problem is the problem of the unhinged relationships between the PCI and the new social strata."

Papetti, the official in charge at Brescia, put it this way: "Here, the PCI has strong worker characteristics and is mixing it up with the other forces to get out of its subordinate position in a 'small and white' area. We are trying to get the PCI out of a minority complex and we view its central position and its hegemonic role through the joint involvement of other strata in our unity-oriented proposals."

## Less Recruits

Bisso, PCI secretary in Genoa, had this to contribute: "We are facing problems and phenomena which we are taking care of rather in a delayed fashion, not having realized that those problems have been maturing and they involve the new strata, the young people, modifications in the working class itself (although hereabouts the manifestations of that are not as relevant). Will the PCI place itself in a tertiary position by shifting toward those strata? I think that we must shift but I think that we can do so without altering the class character."

Rinaldi, secretary of the Modena federation, at first did not grasp the meaning of my question because he told me that "stratification in Emilia emerges in entirely different terms." The secretary of the Che Guevara section in Modena, Spinella, a teacher, instead maintains that "the emergence of new strata, which would change or shift the PCI, is a false problem; all citizens can unite around common interests, such as social peace and welfare."

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The situation in Emilia as a matter of fact has other connotations and features other experiences. The question only is whether it can be a true part of Italy or whether the lacertations of the country's social fabric will be reproduced here likewise. But this is a topic to be taken up separately.

Where we do not have stratifications in the social worker body, to the point of cutting into the PCI, we nevertheless find the same situation in other social areas: First of all, the young people are no longer attracted to the PCI (recruitment is going down, we simply cannot manage to resolve this enigma: why was the party able to absorb the generation born in the battles of 1968 and why is it not able to receive the generation of the troubles of 1975-1976?), since the new intellectuals are increasingly less easy to involve in our activities, that is, the teachers and the doctors, first of all, along with the entire tertiary area which remains a tertiary point for the party.

Is the PCI unprepared for getting close to the new decisive strata in industrialized society because, in its doctrinaire approach, it had made no provision for their birth and their separation from the shapeless magma of the "world of labor" or is the PCI slow in getting going out of fear of losing its own image, slipping to a tertiary position, becoming more social-democratic, or even integralist?

In this connection, the considerations or the lack of considerations regarding the PSI and the new Craxi lines are indicative and I was able to pick them up throughout my survey trip. Giuliano Ferrara told me in Turin: "Quite frankly, what seems to be an element of strength during this phase as far as the socialists are concerned, is tied to the fact that they can cover the most diverse expectations and the most immediate needs of those different social groups. They can be the party that reflects the combination of the new needs; they can promote the radical line while at the same time, at Fiat, they express the most moderate Piedmont approach."

During a seminar of section secretaries of Lombardy, at the PCI school in Faggeto, on Lake Como, I noted a series of judgments: "How to attract the PSI to the idea of unity. That party has forgotten the working class and is now turning toward the other social spheres." "We must ask ourselves whether the PSI is still in the area of the left." "The PSI is a force of easy pseudo-socialist makeup. The moment an idea of change comes out, it is adulterated by a socialist. Along the periphery, we can still control them, the socialists, but we have to keep them from the top."

Then, during a debate with a group of participants, concerning the specific topic, when I objected to a note of bitterness which one could detect toward the PSI, I got this reply: "The PSI is aiming at new strata by supporting their demands for their own central position within the class concept and that is contrary to the party's concept on the disadvantaged class in modern society."

Another participant however argued against that idea which supposedly is more consonant with the French party than the Italian party: "The PSI can indeed be a pole of attraction precisely because we have accentuated the worker aspect far too long. There is no support for the positions of the PCI because we have overlooked those strata and their demands."

Regional secretary Cervetti then made the following remark: "The PSI grabs hold of the emerging middle strata in a rather nebulous fashion but it does grab hold of

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them; it expresses a state of mind rather than a program." Papetti, at Brescia, told me this: "The PSI detected the emergence of the middle strata before we did. We have to see where this is going to lead. Others, at the time, had also expressed their frustration and we know where that led." At Turin, Vertone got the idea when he told me: "Craxi has the advantage of being able to be on the left regarding custom and on the right regarding the economy. Ingrao and Napolitano at the same time. The trouble for Berlinguer is all the worse: He should all at once be Schmidt and Marchais."

It seemed to me that I could feel that the bitterness toward Craxi did not come so much from his alliance with the DC as from the agile and unprejudiced way in which he moves in the field of new stratifications, pushing the PCI now to the right and now to the left. Sometimes, during the section meetings which I attended, one could still detect the old notes of intolerance on the part of those who consider themselves to be vanguard by virtue of antonomasia, with an old-style integralism where it is the "hegemonic force," the new Gramscian prince, that is, the PCI, which arranges and selects the position of the others.

These are doctrinaire projections which are difficult to remove, as the militants and the leaders themselves admitted to me. The PCI perhaps will not be the first party to discover this but it should be the first party to admit that modern society turns out to be more composite than Marx had imagined and much more difficult to put together than Lenin had imagined. This is a travail which makes it uncertain on the inside and peremptory on the outside.

[7 Jan 81, p 3]

[Text] A "lay" PCI, free of demons. The communists are trying to create the image of "a modern party for a modern society." The difficult chase after the "new class," that is to say, the emerging strata, the social middle strata, necessitates the elimination of the obsessions of the Marxist religion. "The fact that we are seeking a third way shows that we are not finding any answers even in the old divinities."

Turin. In Turin, there are 14 election votes in favor of the party for every registered, card-carrying PCI member. At Milan, the ratio is five voters for every militant and at Genoa, every card-carrying member on the average mobilizes six voters. In Emilia-Romagna, the party almost coincides with its body of voters: out of every two persons voting communist, one is a party member. The interpretation which Pajetta gave me for this phenomenon is more than anything else psychological or based on habit. He says that in Emilia the wife is proud when the husband becomes section secretary; the Piedmont wife on the other hand is annoyed when the husband takes the job nobody else is ready to accept.

During my survey trip I however also ran into other interpretations from which emerges a diversification in the way in which the party is conceived. In the industrial areas, it has been shaping up as a worker-oriented, vanguard and, in some ways, exclusive party. Let us put it bluntly: aristocracy in reverse.

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In Turin, a decisive factor was the split between the city and the workers and the split between the old-time residents and the new arrivals among the labor force. The "Sampaolo" people, noble communists of the New Order and the internal committees, still impose doctrinaire rigor in recruiting individuals into the party. If not, they say, the party runs the risk of becoming watered down, thus losing its connotation as a vanguard. At Milan and Genoa, the gap is not as wide, in spite of the persistent worker-oriented preclusions, whereas the ramification of industries promotes a more capillary pattern also regarding the communists. In the cities they are more blended here with the less mastodontic production sectors.

In Emilia

In Emilia, the ratio of 1:2 indicates almost an entirely different kind of party. I am told that the vanguard here is identical with the people. That does not mean that the PCI in this part of the country has become a popular party, if you will, also with populist features, starting with the peasant league, growing through the cooperative movement, and spreading in a capillary fashion into the fabric of civilian and political society over a long period of being in power in Emilia. The specific mix, between the rural, the crafts, and the small-industry ingredients, as the foundation of the "Emilia model of prosperity," rests on an economic and social fabric which is very different from what it is in the Northern triangle.

It is very probable that the lacerations and the crucible of the latter will have more of an effect on the search for the image of a "modern party for a modern society," which the PCI is pursuing today. But in one way or another, in both of them the possible and probable models, the relationship with the new emerging strata is once again at the very focus. The fluctuations in the statistics, indicated earlier, as a matter of fact reflect the degree to which the PCI has managed to adapt itself to the new stratifications.

Overall, this is indicative of the fact that the communists are in a better shape, in terms of elections, in the more developed areas and in modern society. But it is also true that, precisely here, they recently registered the first rather worrisome cracks. The comfort in the latest election defeat resided in the fact that we lost in the south and that we held our position in the North-Central section. This is where the "new party" will be born--if it has to be born some fine day. And it cannot be born without a well-developed link with the new middle strata which cannot be catalogued in doctrinaire terms and which cannot be pinned down socially.

A few figures, given me by Bisso, the PCI secretary for Genoa, give us a correct grasp of the problem: "First of all, in the industrial establishments in Genoa, the ratio between workers and technicians was 80 against 20 percent but now it is 50 against 50." The problem is how to eliminate that "against."

The PCI section secretary at Italcantieri, in Sestri Levante, Roberto Ierle, expressed the danger in these terms: "The new stratification finds us unprepared. We have not yet caused any clash but there are those who want to provoke one. Here, for example, the policy of Craxi cannot be interpreted in any way other than an

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attempt at getting closer to those emerging strata--an attempt, however, in terms of a clash. We are convinced that the socialist proposal is not aimed at really responding to the needs of those strata but is designed to set them up as an opposition force to the old working class."

On that score, let us look at the proposals of the PCI, the blueprints designed to clean up or prevent such opposition. At Genoa, Bisso starts with what has to be done: "Since we do not have a ready-made model, we are not even looking at the social democrats because they have no answer either. The fact that we are looking for a third way shows that we are not finding any answers even among the old divinities. We are working on a party which is facing a class with completely new problems. But here we run into a politically higher question. We can respond only through a multiplicity of organizations, within the factories, upgrading the professional standards, through local entities, involving all of the professional strata in the construction of a new living standard."

"Workers and technicians," continues Bisso, "become less antagonistic also through greater unionization. In the PCI itself we are already electing the managers and technicians of the factories to the positions of section secretaries. But we still have some trouble, for instance, with Sinquadri."

Regarding this last item, I encountered a different attitude at the Mirafiori PCI section in Turin: The prevailing opinion is that the gathering of "cadres" [management and supervisory personnel] in a separate labor union must not necessarily conflict with the worker unions. Bertinotti, the regional secretary of the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor] at Turin, has a better solution for absorbing the new stratifications. This involves work organization. His proposal practically tends to break the assembly line since it was technology that dug the moat between technical labor and manual labor.

Bertinotti asks himself this question: "How can we reconstruct the new central setup, broken up as it is among the new components, and at the same time prevent a polarization between workers and technicians?" And he answers himself right away: "We have to reach out to integrated production groups which can build a collective professional constituency, in other words, we must, within the same group, combine manual labor, control, maintenance, information, planning, in order to restore a direct link between the assembly-line worker, the technician, the planner, the clerical employee, all of whom are employed in a certain production sector. In Val di Susa, for example, we organize work in terms of work islands."

It seemed to me nevertheless that, in Milan, they went further in working out a new class concept and a new concept for interconnections between the new strata. It was above all here that I found the most criticism of "wage levelling," the consequence of a demagogically egalitarian policy and a "uncritical defense of difficult work," so far conducted by the party.

While I was discussing the situation with a group of base organization secretaries from Lombardy, I came to feel similar attitudes. Cipolla, a secretary in a factory, told me: "We no longer want to be in agreement with those who demand equal wage hikes for everybody." Averse, a section secretary, said: "We now realize that

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there has been a decline in the working class, as we understood it once upon a time or as Marx and the other Marxist thinkers understood it." Para, an enterprise secretary, commented: "We have not come up with the correct response to the disruptive birth of the tertiary sector, of the kind of work which is no longer manual in the traditional sense. Technology has redimensioned the position of man as a producer."

The Workers

Said Di Blasio: "We are discovering that we are falling behind with respect to the new classes that were not immediately an expression of the working class. As if to support our position, we exclusively looked to the working class, neglecting the new intermediate stratum and looking upon it as a parasitary element in the development of society. This caused a gap between the PCI and strata which however still are considered to be workers. The debate on egalitarianism also frequently embroiled us, entailing the risk of professional and wage levelling which in turn led to a series of wasteful events."

Taverniti, a section secretary and teacher, expressed the following opinion: "In a modern society, where the working class, and I am still putting it between quotation marks, in an old-style approach, is no longer the main and moving force, we must work out a proposal which will involve all of the new forces of labor."

Cervetti, the regional secretary for Lombardy and a member of the PCI directorate, then explained to me the fundamental features of a new concept of the working class and its interconnections. Simplifying the formula, we would have this: Manual worker plus skilled worker plus technician plus clerical employee plus manager together add up to the working individual as such, this time with initial capital letters, giving us the new central figure of modern society. And the PCI precisely proposes to be the "Gramscian intellectual prince" of this composite new hegemonic class.

In reviewing the theoretical concepts--because we are dealing here with a real revision--we find that the economic component prevails over the political and social component. The new intermediate stratum is being discovered and properly analyzed. But we offer it only historical rehabilitation given the fact that so far it has been treated rather badly by the communists, just as Marx mistreated the "petty bourgeois," just as Lenin despised what he called "M'elkaya burzhoaziya" [petty bourgeoisie].

Right now, to support this revision, we fall back on Togliatti, quoting his theses on the middle strata, on the artisans and clerical employees, who are considered possible allies. But the substance of the new phenomenon often escapes us, that is, the fact that we are not dealing here with unsafe social strata, engulfed by capitalism, who, to avoid extinction, are persuaded to seek the protective alliance of the working class, since they are likewise in the process of proletarianization, as Togliatti had maintained so correctly.

Nor are we dealing here with small craftsmen or merchants whom Lenin, through the NEP, had invited to liven up the rather rigid and heavy-handed social-government-controlled economy. The phenomenon is new in that the modern intermediate stratum springs from the stratification of labor as a whole, gradually becoming decisive in the production mechanisms of the new technologies and in the tertiary super-structures of the new way of life and working.

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They demand not only wage protection but also protection for their political and social positions. In their as yet not fully defined outline, they take shape as an intermediate class in a double meaning. While it agrees that it is no longer "the servant of the bosses," it does not yet manage to establish itself fully and dissociates itself both from the employers and from the workers.

In many ways, it is the historically new class which, by emerging and by emancipating itself, is already determining the fate of societies not only in the West but in peculiar forms also in the East (the production technocracy which fights the parasitary bureaucracy, both of which were born of the worker state). Rather than absorbing them in an amorphous, integral and integralist "world of labor," the important thing is to keep up with them, with those new strata, in the context of the new European reality.

And what can keeping up with them signify for a party such as the PCI? This is the big issue at the very core of the revision that is in progress among the Italian communists. To say, "new party," can conceal the old communist syndrome or mask the redirection of the social democratic complex, just as it can also lead to the redemption, by both of them, of the obsessions of the Marxist religion, in the end leading to the birth of a lay party. As a matter of fact, I often ran into a recurring phrase on the party: "Liberate it from its own demons, make it become laic."

(The second installment of our survey trip to the PCI, competition for the middle strata," published on Sunday, 4 January, there is a mistake between the quotation marks in the following phrase: "The shame is all the greater for Berlinguer: he should, at once, be both Schmidt and Marchais." This statement by Frane Barbieri, the article's author, thus seems to be attributed to his conversation partner, Saverio Vertone, managing editor of the Turin magazine NUOVASOCIETA.)

[10 Jan 81, p 3]

[Text] The "turnaround" in the Italian Communist Party's sections. Talk with the militants on the "Salerno" document and the break with the DC [Christian Democratic Party]. "We were with those who were involved in the scandals." "But now there is a danger of isolation." In no other communist party would such a debate have been possible. Is there a middle way between the Soviet model and the social-democratic model?

Once upon a time the Italian communists were divided into those who, in talking, imitated Togliatti, and those who instead copied Pajetta. From Togliatti they took the simultaneously subdued and professorial tone, without being able to reproduce his acuity. From Pajetta they borrowed judicial impulsiveness without achieving his lucidity. Today, throughout the sections, I find that almost everybody talks like Berlinguer, with a touch of slightly faded transcendence which makes Italy appear, at once, the center and the province of the world.

The sections of the PCI [Italian Communist Party] look like small international parliaments. During the meetings they take up all of the world's problems in the sure knowledge that the correct solutions are bound to emerge from that debate.

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My impression was perhaps accentuated by the fact that the journey into the PCI coincided with the latest "turnabout" in the party and with the Polish crisis. It was discovered that we could no longer trust the DC, nor the USSR and that the PCI basically remained a single point of reference, both for the fate of the country and for the world's socialist prospects.

From outside the party, its famous sections are visualized in various ways, as a kind of Masonic lodge, with mystical and secret rites, as places of conspiracy, or as moving forces of agitation, ready to get in motion the moment somebody pushes the button. Perhaps the party is also responsible for this by allowing a dose of mystery and another dose of myth to develop around its organizations. As if it had remained an underground party, although in many ways being the most public among the Italian parties (if anything, by virtue of the volume of political work done).

In the sections I visited, however, I was unable to find or experience any of that romantic background atmosphere. They vary greatly, depending upon the environment: sometimes they are like members of the clubs that promoted Enlightenment, with so many bearded wiseacres; at other times they resemble a parish meeting charged with politics (document study meetings, drafting of manifestos, distribution of flyers, continuing battles for every membership card, fund-raising drives and material assistance).

There was a certain degree of agitation just about everywhere in connection with the latest document coming out of the directorate. I did not find a single militant who maintained that he went along with it. The document was eagerly wanted by many but expected by nobody. One fellow told me at Brescia: "A turning point, with or without quotation marks, is an upheaval also because it unexpectedly rained from the skies." Reactions to the break with the DC came in two steps: Before and after the interpretation of the interview of Berlinguer with Reichlin.

During the first two days, everything went at a full gallop, giving full rein to emotions and to easy revolutionary enthusiasm. People had been going along without a clearly drawn front line for 4 years. Now the lines seemed to have been restored: Once again there was a revolution to be made, without half-way measures and without so many compliments. As if history, with the full weight of its inevitability, had once again sided with the PCI and the PCI alone, exclusively working for the communists. Then came the dialectical and business-as-usual treatise by Berlinguer. Everything changed and nothing changed and things once again became complicated, historical patience once again appeared strained.

Grass-roots and Summit

There is probably no party in the world which, without confusing things, can maintain that its top leadership mechanically expresses the feelings of the rank and file. But like the others, the PCI at times also maintained that. And it was not true. Just as it was not true when the others maintained that the rank and file always and only carried out the orders from topside. The PCI directorate carries great weight, by virtue of the mechanism's pyramidal structures, by virtue of democratic centralism (where the emphasis is never equally distributed), by virtue of the party's tradition as a really underground outfit, and finally by virtue of the high level of training and prestige of the central leaders.

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I do not know other cases, perhaps there have been some, but if one wanted to find a case where the leadership expressed not only the thinking but also the feeling of the rank and file, it seems to me that we have found it and that we have kept close track of it precisely on the occasion of the latest "Salerno turnabout." In Rome, the regional actit on the very first day received the report on the change in direction with an explosion of applause. "I almost felt disavowed," one of the Lazio officials told me.

In an urban section of Turin, I witnessed a similar reception while attending the meeting of the 15th section. Let me quote some remarks. Valle: "The turnabout is very important to the PCI. We are changing the policy which was aimed at holding our hegemony role down. Now the important thing is to resume our revolutionary impetus on the inside. If we are not capable of doing that, it would be like trying to circle the globe in a Savoia-Marchetti."

Elia: "At Avellino, which is the kingdom of De Mita, the historical compromise was put together in the most caddish fashion. The PCI and the DC met to decide who was to be the delegate at Alfa Sud. We had considered De Mita the man of compromise but now we found that he was a mafioso. I breathed a sigh of relief." Pittarello: "We were in a rather ambiguous situation also regarding the Central Committee. Now we must clarify whether the democratic alternative means the management of the situation and of power within the context of the logic of profit or whether it serves to change and eliminate capitalism. Change, not polish up again and white-wash."

Just one day later, it looked like an entirely different party at the meeting of the Fiat section in Mirafiori. Everybody shared the judgment expressed by Dilonardo, the reporting officer: "This is a document of exceptional character, given the exceptional nature of the country's situation. The danger of getting caught in a moderate involution is real and the PCI cannot help but offer itself as an alternative. We do not sweep the party line away, we do not create a crisis for the historical compromise which, for us, is a long-range strategy."

After the meeting I stopped to discuss the situation with some militants, asking them: "How come that I find that you, the workers, are more moderate than we, the communists, downtown?" Cerabona, a young lathe operator from the South, answered for all of them: "The culture of the working class has not yet made its entry in the schools. If by a moderate approach you mean that you have to be realistic, then let this moderation come. We express values in terms of solidarity and these values are not learned in books but through sacrifice, day after day, through interpersonal contacts and contact on the job. This is our organizational experience and it brings us to this calm line of reasoning."

"We, too, underwent traumas during that period of time," the young man continued. "But, before saying a single word, the worker spends one or two years being very quiet, before understanding what this is all about. This is why he does not make his analysis in spontaneist terms, as the college students do. When we went to state our case at the universities and presented our analyses, they came with the fire brigade. They analyzed the party's policy through different channels, through radical-chic journals, not those of the PCI."

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In a kind of combination convent and mansion at Faggeto, on Lake Como, I attended the seminar of the section leaders of Northern Lombardy. The turnabout of the PCI of course was the focus of the debate. Berlinguer's dialectic was taken by the participants in, let us say, a dialectical manner. They agreed that a change in direction can also signify continuity but they realized quite clearly "the errors made during those years which the document not seeks to correct." Let me list some of them.

Spinelli: "The PCI wanted to push the country way over to the other side, from mid-stream, but it was forced to backtrack. The others did not follow us. But the values of that period of time are going to be safeguarded." Porcaro: "We were in with those involved in the scandals and now we have to pick up the pieces and put them back together again. It was rather a slick thing to enter into agreements with the local DC secretaries, trying to pass them off as an agreement with the Catholics. Often we did not try hard to jostle the DC. That was a limiting factor for the policy of the PCI." After the turnabout however people detected "the danger of isolation of the PCI, now propagandized by Craxi."

## Thinking of the Italian Socialist Party

People also get to feel a rather peremptory solution to the problem: We must force the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] and others to give us a response. We cannot allow them to avoid the issue. Those gentlemen must give us a clear answer." Greppi has a different opinion: "We have to fight in order to explain that there has been no turnabout, only that the earlier proposals included the one from the DC but now exclude it. There has always been a tendency to struggle outside the DC in the sections." Perini does not even overlook the toughest issue, the issue of responsibility at the very top likewise: "Now we can detect twists of opinion in many.

Is it true that the PCI's errors were inevitable or did we come up with the wrong situation estimate? These were decisions made by the top leadership which the rank and file did not understand. If somebody was unable to handle a certain phase, you have to make him understand it clearly."

At Brescia, the party, with its hard worker-oriented tradition, suffered moreover the combination clash and meeting with the dominant "whitewall," which is the term the Catholics use. Capovecchi, a worker who is a member of the community council, told me: "The PCI went through a long phase in an ambivalent manner. Hence the more or less marked enthusiasm. If the PCI has any need for adding other proposals to its own proposal, it must nevertheless avoid obsessively falling back on an alliance in an area where it is going to lose ground. In that way we have already lost some connotations typical of the party which has become unravelled."

At Modena, one can easily detect that the communists have been in power for a long time. To some extent, they perceive the historical compromise in an opposite sense. As a matter of fact, a group of section secretaries, whom I met at the federation, heavily emphasized a problem which had to do with government: "It is true that the working class no longer followed us with excessive enthusiasm; but there is the danger of isolation, we might find ourselves on the outside, looking in." They are furthermore "confused by this famous democracy: here, the decisions are made by the leadership, while the recent Central Committee meeting did not even start a debate."

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I encountered the strongest judgments however at the actif of the Bolognina section in Bologna. That enabled me to anticipate what was going to come: nowhere do you find as much of a generation gap as here and among the oldsters, who are still running the show, you find interspersed some youngsters camouflaged with beards.

Here are two extreme judgments. Said old militant Grassia: "We have lost many along the way. The experience of the majority was decisively negative. While the workers tell us that we are going hand in hand with the Christian Democrats, we note that we are not making any headway, almost going along with the proposal of lightening the worker's pay envelope." And Torinello, a young man, commented: "We cannot think of getting into the government without the business operators and the other forces and parties. Otherwise, we would have to pull our oars back into the boat and withdraw. At moments of transition, even a proposal of the social-democratic type is a step forward."

At Genoa, on the other hand, the secretary of the port worker section communicated the following feeling to me: "The turnabout represents redemption for those who were silent during the years of solidarity. The workers had not spoken up during the meetings for 3 years. They felt attacked and isolated and in certain ways abandoned by the party."

One thing seems sure to me: such a debate would have been inconceivable in any other communist party anywhere in the world. At the same time it seems certain to me that, in every other democratic party, such a dispute would have caused a leadership crisis. Today, as always, the PCI presents itself simply as a "different" party. It more or less clarified what it does not wish to be: neither of the Soviet type, nor of the social democratic type. It would also have to spell out what type of party and consequently what type of society is involved. But is there a middle way? We will see about that in talking to the militants of the sections themselves.

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